O'Donnell, 'On Philology' URL = http://hegel.lib.ncsu.edu/stacks/serials/bmcr/bmcr-v2n01-o'donnell-on 2.1.19, Jan Ziolkowski, ed. *On Philology.* University Park, PA: Pennsylvania StateUniversity Press, 1990. $8.95. ISBN 0271007168. (Also published as vol.27, no. 1 1990 of the journal Comparative Literature Studies. Editorialcontents are identical.) Rev. by J.J. O'Donnell ``What is Philology?'' is the question asked by the convener of thisHarvard symposium (held in March 1988) and addressed by a dozen contributorsin all. The papers are short (the dozen contributions fill 78 pages) andlightly footnoted. Most of the contributors are classicists, but medieval,Celtic, and Afro-American studies are also represented, with MargaretAlexiou's contribution on classical and post-classical Greek literaturetaking the broadest view. Classicists on the panel include Ziolkowski,Clausen, Nagy, Watkins, and Thomas. Reference to other writers and theoristsis haphazard at best, with only token bows to Saussure, de Man, and a veryfew other contemporary theorists, and perhaps an over-emphasis on a piece byWalter Jackson Bate on ``The Crisis in English Studies'' that appeared inHarvard Magazine in 1982. The only non-Harvard participant was JonathanCuller, invited as respondent. Difficile est saturam non scribere. Difficult, but necessary. Too muchsatire nowadays. Too much digging trenches and lobbing grenades. Too muchpolarizing around bogus hypostases. Too damn many lines drawn in the sand. The underlying historical fact is that philology is not a branch, or species,of metaphysics, but a craft, an ink-stained trade with delusions of grandeur. The philology practiced at any given moment is, in simplest terms, ``whatworks for me'' (ut nostrates aiunt). The circumstances that govern what doesin fact ``work for'' us are complex and labile. At the moment, we are facedwith a world in which what used to work for most of us doesn't work for someof us, and what now works for some of us doesn't work for others. This is nonew thing, and it would be dangerous to assume that the condition ispermanent. And in the meantime, it would be mere silly bad manners to behaveas though there were two opposing camps with one or the other of which everyscholar must align. The Harvard symposium was a failure because it was organized by peoplewho thought they saw such polarization and were at a loss to know how torespond. What they did was gather a handful of ``philologists'' and havethem offer impressionistic and ill-informed explanations of their craft; andto invite a single member of the perceived opposition to come and comment. The results are sterile and uninformative; worse, they are unhelpful and theymake painful reading. To my taste, a far better model for such discourse maybe found in the ``New Philology'' symposium in the January 1990 issue ofSpeculum. That set of papers by medievalists does not lead to any magicalresolution of issues or lightning strokes of clarification, but consists ofa group of attempts to say how what we used to think important and what weare now coming to think important can be reconciled with each other. Exercises of this sort are valuable and will, and should, continue until thegaps have narrowed and the issues have not been resolved -- no philosophicalissue raised by any thinker from the pre-Socratics to the present can befairly said, I think, to have been resolved to general satisfaction -- buthave simply disappeared, or ceased to seem relevant or urgent. The Harvardsymposium is in the end a useful caution: how not to think about theseissues. James J. O'Donnell University of Pennsylvania