Tritle, 'Aeschines and Athenian Politics', Bryn Mawr Classical Review 9508
URL = http://hegel.lib.ncsu.edu/stacks/serials/bmcr/bmcr-9508-tritle-aeschines
@@@@95.9.9, Harris, Aeschines and Athenian Politics
Edward M. Harris, Aeschines and Athenian Politics. Oxford
and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Pp. x + 233.
$49.95. ISBN-0-19-508285-0.
Reviewed by Lawrence A. Tritle -- Loyola Marymount University
ltritle@lmumail.lmu.edu
Who lost Greece to Philip of Macedon? Aeschines, if you had
asked Demosthenes c. 343 BC, Demosthenes, if you had asked
Aeschines. The struggle between Athens and Macedon--between the
forces of freedom and those of tyranny to put it rhetorically
perhaps--is nearly overshadowed by the dramatic and unyielding
battle waged by Aeschines and Demosthenes in the courts and
assemblies of Athens. Yet this conflict is itself a problem in
the study of fourth century Athenian history. How are the
speeches of Aeschines and Demosthenes to be trusted? What do
they reveal about Athenian attitudes--as well as actions--
regarding the growing power and presence of Macedon in Greek
affairs? These are just some of the issues that Edward Harris
raises in this first full-length investigation of the life and
career of the orator Aeschines.
The first problem is one of credibility, or to phrase it as H.
does in his first chapter, "Whom to Believe?" Both Aeschines and
Demosthenes provide much biographical data for reconstructing
Aeschines' social origins and career, not to mention his
politics, but this is skewed by the nature of the evidence,
forensic discourse. As H. notes, Aeschines and Demosthenes not
only "rarely agree on the facts," but also "not infrequently
contradict each other" (p. 7). What follows is an analysis of
both the nature of oratory as well as that of courtroom battles
that is basically sound. H., however, is most interested in
establishing a methodology that will allow for the "truth" to
emerge from the rhetorical fireworks. He sensibly rejects A.
Schaefer's argument for "consistency," i.e., that if a speaker
gives one account of an event, but later contradicts himself, he
is inconsistent and therefore unreliable throughout. Instead, H.
argues that an orator could make truthful and misleading, not to
mention deceitful, statements, and that it is up to the
investigator to determine the true from the false (pp. 8-9). The
rest of the chapter examines this problem and here H. discusses
Athenian oratory generally, noting the role of witnesses, the
frequency and punishment of perjury, and problems inherent in
analyzing the written version of an originally oral composition.
In the end, H. concludes with a set of criteria to determine the
reliability of oratorical evidence (pp. 15-16). These points
essentially reflect a critical appraisal of the evidence: who
said what, where, and when, within the context of available
corroborating testimony (e.g., decrees, situations). One aspect
that might have been developed further was the standing of
Aeschines and Demosthenes on the two embassies to Philip. They
were the youngest and so had perhaps the greatest desire or need
to promote and defend themselves. These points are noted by R.
Sealey, Demosthenes and His Time (Oxford, 1993), p. 151, a
work unnoticed by H.
From his assessment, H. proceeds with an investigation of
Aeschines' family and his entry into politics (i.e., ch. 2). The
family of Aeschines did not belong to the wealthy elite of
Athens, the kaloi kagathoi (for a useful discussion of
which see pp. 18-20), and in the early fourth century BC labored
to recover from the damage done to so many in Attica during the
Peloponnesian War. H. discusses Atrometus, Aeschines' father,
his hoplite/mercenary service in the fin-de-siecle Aegean,
followed by his work as a teacher. The appraisal is thorough,
though that regarding Atrometus' mercenary service abroad might
have considered that the rather vague reference to Atrometus in
Asia at this time might encompass the southern Aegean and Cyprus
and the activities of Conon. This possibly gains some
significance in light of the adventures of Cleobulus, Aeschines'
uncle, who participated in some obscure military affair related
to covert Athenian aid to Conon. Such service by Atrometus and
Cleobulus would broadly conform to the action taken by many
Athenians to restore the democracy, which Aeschines claimed for
his family. These could easily be adapted and revised according
to the collective family memory and its needs, political and
social. As an educator, Atrometus provided Aeschines and his
brothers with a sound education, one that allowed them to
socialize with those of the elite. One interesting point that H.
makes is how this shows up in Aeschines' oratory, particularly
the long recitations of poetry. Yet Aeschines was not affluent
enough to pay for lessons with teachers such as Isocrates. Here
H. makes an odd statement on education in Athens, referring to
Aristophanes' Clouds, the hostility toward Socrates'
"thinkery" and other similar attacks on the Sophists and their
influence. All of this comes without a word on Plato and the
Academy, of the likes of Chabrias, Lycurgus, and Phocion (and
others) who were associated with it. Granted, there was a certain
tension between the demos and the budding educational
establishment. Yet a number of Athenians did matriculate in the
schools, enter politics and function in society without
prejudice.
Aeschines emerged from a family of modest but not humble
means, and one that took pride in its military service. It is
interesting to note that not only Aeschines' father and uncle
possess known military records, but also his brother Philochares
who won election as strategos at least three times. As
for Aeschines himself, his own campaign experience, Nemea (366
BC), Mantinea (362 BC), and Euboea (357, 348 BC) was a proud
accomplishment. This, however, did him little good in the eyes
of Demosthenes, who ridiculed his secretarial service to the
boule and ekklesia and even more so his acting
career. H. describes the former clearly, but the impact of
Aeschines' acting could have been weighed more carefully perhaps.
Demosthenes scorned Aeschines for his stage performances,
deriding him as tritagonistes, or the third actor, the one
who played the lesser parts (e.g., Creon in Soph. Ant.).
H. notes, rightly it seems, that acting was not ignoble work--
that some actors, e.g., Aristodemus, became famous on and off the
stage--but then concludes that Aeschines was not a particularly
talented actor, good but not great.
What is of interest here is Aeschines' emergence as a major
figure on the political stage. Is it likely that his service as
a secretary was grand enough to propel him into a position on a
highly critical embassy? How could he have acquired such fame?
On the other hand, a stage career could have brought much
recognition and appeal. Maybe Demosthenes is right and Aeschines
was a tritagonistes. But it would not be the first or the
last time that a "B" grade actor was able to cash in on a
political career. More than a few examples come to mind! Such
fame, a modest family but one with a record of heroic military
service, aided by an opportune marriage into the family of the
wealthy Philodemus, might have been sufficient to allow Aeschines
to enter politics as a new man.
Yet this is not what happened in H.'s reconstruction.
Instead, the argument is advanced that Phocion, the eminent
general and politician, was responsible for launching Aeschines'
political career (p. 37). As a veteran general with numerous
connections, Phocion certainly possessed the stature to sponsor
another in the political arena. Actually, Phocion and his many
colleagues in the strategia may have exercised a little
more influence than H. gives them credit for. In his otherwise
sound discussion of the nature of the Athenian democracy, H.
argues that the generalship did not give "any special privileges
in the Assembly. If he wished to influence public decisions, the
general had to submit a proposal to the Assembly in the same way
as any other Athenian citizen" (p. 34). Against this position I
would cite Plut. Phoc. 15.1, in which Phocion, brought
intelligence of a disturbance in Megara, convened the assembly
and initiated a response (see also Plut. Phoc. 17.1 for a
similar show of authority by the generals, and S. Hornblower,
The Greek World 479-323 BC [London, 1983], p. 120, who
states that "certainly the generals had direct access to the
Assembly, and could propose motions," and id., A Commentary on
Thucydides, Vol. 1: Books I-III [Oxford, 1991], p. 276).
Phocion certainly possessed the wealth and position to assist
others politically, but did he in the case of Aeschines?
Pace H., I would argue that there is insufficient evidence
to establish such a connection. H. presses too much from
Aeschines' service in the Euboean campaign of 348 BC that ended
in the Athenian victory at Tamynae (on this H., p. 188, n. 57,
refers to a review by P. Cartledge, CR 39 (1989): 79-80,
of L.A. Tritle, Phocion the Good [London, 1988]; the
review is by R.A. Knox, who misrepresents the analysis of the
campaign). His argument that Aeschines served as a "volunteer,"
right though it is, overlooks Aeschines' membership in the
epilektoi, a corps of elite troops, all volunteers
established to stiffen the regular phalanx of infantry (see
further L.A. Tritle, "Epilektoi at Athens," AHB 3
[1989]: 54-59). Moreover, other Athenians besides Aeschines
distinguished themselves; on the face of it there is no reason
why Phocion, as the victorious commander, would have paid any
more attention to Aeschines than any other soldier who won
honors.
The Euboean campaign that won Aeschines fame had been
supported by Eubulus, one of the leading political figures of the
day. H. argues that Aeschines now emerged politically because
Eubulus and Phocion needed a mouthpiece, as neither "seems to
have had much talent as an orator" (p. 39). This view lacks
support. Evidence for Eubulus' rhetorical skill is meager, but
he had by 348 BC a record of political accomplishment and
Aeschines called him to his defense in 343 BC (Aeschines 2. 184);
so he must have been at least a competent orator. The evidence
for Phocion, on the other hand, is much more extensive.
Plutarch's lives of Phocion and Demosthenes in fact preserve
significant rhetorical evidence that demonstrates that far from
being an untalented speaker, Phocion's contemporaries ranked him
at the top: Demosthenes called him the "cleaver" (Plut.
Phoc. 5.9) and his skill in the give and take of assembly
debate (i.e., deinotes) was unmatched (Plut. Phoc.
5.5, Dem. 10.3). Neither Eubulus nor Phocion, it would appear,
would have required the services of Aeschines to represent their
views.
It may have been that Aeschines stood closer to Eubulus and
Eubulus' friend and ally Nausicles, who would later nominate
Aeschines to serve on the first embassy to Philip, than to
Phocion. Phocion was certainly a major figure in his own right,
an able speaker who did not require a "voice." It is also
important to note that in the Euboean campaign of 348 BC, a
campaign sponsored largely by Eubulus and Meidias to prop up the
crumbling tyranny of Plutarchus of Eretria, Phocion deposed
Plutarchus. Such an action reflects a strong sense of
independence and a lack of concern for offending political
allies--or seniors.
However it was that Aeschines entered the political scene, he
soon found himself catapulted into the struggle with Philip of
Macedon for leadership of Greece. In the discussion of the
celebrated embassies to Philip, H. does a fine job of analyzing
the great yet complex orations of Aeschines and Demosthenes that
provide the bulk of our knowledge regarding the diplomatic
efforts of both sides. In setting up this analysis, H. provides
an effective discussion of Athenian-Macedonian relations from
Philip's accession in 360/59 BC to the opening overtures for
peace in 348/7 BC. H. seems right in stressing that the Athenian
decision to send an embassy to Philip had more to do with events
in the northern Aegean than in central Greece, i.e., the
perennial Athenian fixation with Amphipolis and concern for the
Chersonesus, rather than the inconclusive and exhausting Sacred
War (p. 55).
In the first embassy to Philip, H. argues that Aeschines
emerged as a major force in negotiating a peace with Philip.
Here it might be wondered to what extent Aeschines acted in
concord with Eubulus' policies. Problems arose when the embassy
returned to Athens and the debate turned to the issue of the role
of the Greeks in the proceedings. Demosthenes, over the
objections of Aeschines and Eubulus, persuaded the demos
that it was in Athens' best interest to treat with Philip when he
was inclined to deal. These points came up in the three days of
debate that stretched over 18, 19, 25 Elaphebolion 346 BC. The
debate in the ekklesia was contentious, with the other
notables, Aristophon, Eubulus making their contributions to the
discussion. A treaty and alliance with Philip was accepted, one
that meant giving up a one time ally, Cersebleptes, the Thracian
king, and the claim to Amphipolis. In return, Athens received
peace and an alliance and security for the Chersonesus.
Why did the Athenians accept this offer? On the one hand,
they did obtain peace and security, of sorts, and all they gave
up was a claim to Amphipolis, which they did not control anyway,
and an ally, Cersebleptes, who was not all that winsome in the
first place. One possible key, and the one that H. might have
done more with, was the debacle in Euboea in 348/7 BC, the
capture of the general Molossus and a number of his men by the
now unemployed Plutarchus of Eretria and his mercenaries (cf. H.,
pp. 120, 157, who [in the latter reference] refers to Molossus'
defeat. I think it more likely that Molossus and his troops,
after Tamynae, became complacent, were caught off guard and then
held for ransom). To win freedom for these, the Athenians paid a
stiff price (of fifty talents, Sch. Dem. 5.5, Plut.
Phoc. 14.2). This crisis, not entirely dissimilar to the
Bosnian problem facing the UN, NATO, and the US in 1995, reflects
a certain Athenian indecisiveness, an unwillingness to meet
force, a tendency to flinch rather than stand. In 347/6 BC, when
the negotiations that would lead to the Peace of Philocrates
began, the Athenians might have been looking for easy, painless
solutions to their problems.
Subsequent to the negotiations, a second embassy, again
including Aeschines and Demosthenes and the other original
envoys, traveled to Macedon to receive Philip's oaths. It was
this journey that would complete the growing breach between them.
Upon reaching Pella, the Athenians found other Greek delegations
present, hoping to negotiate a peace with Philip and end the
Sacred War.
The negotiations that began here would end that conflict, at
great cost to the Phocians, who would see their cities razed and
a huge indemnity imposed. Philip solidified his grip over
Thessaly, and central Greece and Thebes found itself with an all
too powerful friend--Philip--entirely too close at hand.
Aeschines, who attempted, H. claims, to persuade Philip to limit
Theban power, in the end yielded to Philip's terms for ending the
war, which meant the destruction of Phocis. In view of the
situation, it is difficult to see how any other outcome might
have resulted. Demosthenes, however, was skeptical of Philip's
designs and promises and would later claim (in his speech
attacking Aeschines in 343 BC, On the False Embassy) that
Aeschines had conspired with Philip to destroy Phocis, deceiving
his fellow envoys in the process. H. refutes this and argues that
Demosthenes and Aeschines had only differed over policy toward
Thebes, not Phocis. The debate was indeed bitter if not
rancorous, nowhere revealed better than in Aeschines'
simultaneous prosecution of Timarchus, an ally of Demosthenes.
Aeschines struck first, and so survived.
The Peace of Philocrates was good for Philip and unsatisfying
to the Athenians. Following the Peace, various yet eventually
unsuccessful bids to renegotiate led to the final rupture with
Philip. Aeschines surely participated in these discussions, but
the evidence, as H. notes, is slim. But Aeschines "had staked
his reputation" (p. 114) that Philip would grant Athens the
benefits he had rather vaguely spoken of in 346 BC. Philip's
supposed benefits proved rather meager: a "gift" of Halonnesus
(which the Athenians believed theirs anyway!), and a promise of
arbitration regarding disputed territories in the Chersonesus
(pp. 112-15). This prompts H. to state that "Aeschines had
trusted in Philip to provide him with the proof of Macedonian
goodwill. Philip let him down" (p. 115). Rather than find
fault with Philip, it appears that Aeschines--and by extension
the Athenians--were just a bit gullible, and that Aeschines may
have been in over his head in dealing with the wily king of the
north. Again the "Euboean syndrome" comes to mind, underlining
Athenian lack of resolve. In this may lie too Demosthenes'
frustrations in dealing with Philip and Aeschines, which led him
to his later denunciation of Aeschines, Philocrates, and the
negotiations.
In 343 BC, Demosthenes, possibly averting Timarchus' fate,
attacked Aeschines in the now famous prosecution On the False
Embassy, dredging up the negotiations of three years before.
In the end, Aeschines, supported by Eubulus, Nausicles, and
Phocion, beat back Demosthenes' effort to pin the blame for the
Peace and ensuing problems on him. H. notes rightly that the
close vote certainly reflected the times and how undecided
opinion in Athens was regarding the prospects of peace and the
alliance with Philip. Yet it seemed too that Aeschines had
backed the wrong horse, that Philip was not going to come up with
any concessions that would make good his pledges to either
Aeschines or the Athenians. Meanwhile, Demosthenes was already
actively winning friends for Athens--the Arcadians, Argives,
Messenians, et al.--and so was not just talking about benefiting
Athens but was doing something about it (p. 119). Little wonder
then that as Demosthenes' stock soared Aeschines' plunged.
The Peace of Philocrates, so difficult to obtain, ended
quickly in 340 BC when Philip moved aggressively in the North,
leading the Athenians to throw over the stele proclaiming the
Peace's provisions. In the struggle that followed, the Athenians
and their allies would battle Philip at Byzantium and elsewhere
in the North, in Euboea, and then finally, would lure away from
him Thebes, sometime foe and friend, in Demosthenes' great
diplomatic revolution. In discussing these events, H. acutely
notes how Aeschines, Demosthenes, Eubulus, and Phocion all closed
ranks, put their differences aside and worked together to defeat
Philip. They would fall short of that goal, as Philip would
sweep the field at Chaeronea in 338/7 BC. What is critical to
emphasize here, as H. does in his conclusion, is the emptiness of
labels such as "pro" and "anti" Macedonian. The point has been
made before: that the issues facing the Athenians in dealing
with Philip were complex and not disposed to easy, painless
decisions. H.'s clear description of the concerted Athenian
effort against Philip brings additional weight and reason for
discarding an obsolete view.
Philip broke and humiliated Thebes at Chaeronea, but his
settlement with Athens, thanks to Aeschines, Demades, Phocion and
the Athenian fleet, was generous. Aeschines soon began to fade
into the background, overshadowed by the more flamboyant, and
greedy, Demades who was always willing to make a deal. In 336 BC
Ctesiphon proposed honors for Demosthenes and all the good that
he had done for Athens. As H. suggests, this was perhaps more
than Aeschines could stomach. Aeschines attacked Ctesiphon's
decree as illegal and blocked it. The actual suit would wait six
years, as Aeschines bided his time waiting for an opportune
moment to prosecute. That moment arrived in 330 BC with news of
the victory of Alexander the Great at Gaugamela. The status quo,
the Macedonian grip upon Greece would thus continue, and
Aeschines resorted now to every device possible to heap
responsibility on Demosthenes' doorstep. In an ad hominem
attack, he linked Demosthenes to tales of Persian bribery and
contrasted him with the noble Athenians of old who died fighting
the Mede. Yet in the end, when the votes were tallied, Aeschines
emerged the big loser, possibly retiring to Rhodes (pp. 141-48).
H. explains this vindication of Demosthenes noting that
Demosthenes portrayed Chaeronea as a valiant fight for a good
cause, while Aeschines depicted it as a disaster. Both were
right. But in the circumstances, the jurors preferred
Demosthenes' shining vision of the past to Aeschines' negativism.
Who can blame them? The vote is unsurprising--again Aeschines
had miscalculated.
Interpreting Attic oratory is as difficult as comprehending
all the vague allusions and jokes in Aristophanes. Edward Harris
has established a portrait of Aeschines that is credible yet
sensitive, and allows the man to emerge from the oratory.
Rangling over the speeches of Aeschines and Demosthenes will
continue, but not without notice of this book.