Thomas, 'Justice of the Greeks', Bryn Mawr Classical Review 9508
URL = http://hegel.lib.ncsu.edu/stacks/serials/bmcr/bmcr-9508-thomas-justice
@@@@95.9.23, Sealey, Justice of the Greeks
Raphael Sealey, The Justice of the Greeks. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1994. Pp. 159. $37.50. ISBN
0-472-10524-8.
Reviewed by Carol G. Thomas -- University of Washington
carolt@u.washington.edu
Maintenance of social order is essential to all communities
and thus the study of law tends to be comparative, examining the
differences, similarities and developments in the means of
defining and enforcing rules of behavior. Another thrust toward
comparison arises from the perspective of any writer on the
subject: the prevailing definition of justice provides a frame of
reference that must either be acknowledged or overcome in
examining the definitions reached by other societies.
R. Sealey's most recent book testifies to the value of such a
perspective. The Justice of the Greeks has the Greek
concept and practice of justice as its central focus, but the
Greek definition is set over against earlier, contemporary and
later beliefs. In providing a context that stretches from early
Mesopotamian to modern concepts of law by way of the Hittites,
Hebrews, Romans and early Germanic peoples, S. accomplishes far
more than offering "control groups" (70) for the Greek case. As
my colleague Sandra Joshel asserts, an understanding of a
culture's system of justice furnishes a sure clue to the whole
social fabric of that culture. That assertion is beautifully
demonstrated in this study.
Several basic tenets underlie the account. Carefully defined
at the outset in an initial chapter presenting the scope of
inquiry, they guide the discussion through the remaining five
chapters. Presented first because of its importance to the
entire treatment is the belief that law or justice "springs from
normative ideas embedded in the Indo-European vocabulary" (ix).
It follows that the author treats the history of law not as
social history but a branch of intellectual history, developing
in accord with the normative ideas of a given society. Coupled
with this tenet is another: normative ideas "were first given
practical and institutional effect by the Greeks of antiquity"
(ix). A main element in the Greek development was the invention
of codes of prescriptive law, which were understood in ways
different from those of the Romans and modern nations.
Attribution of "invention" to any people can raise a red flag
of implied superiority. No such charge can be leveled against S.
who consistently avoids judgment both for or against the Greek
belief. "It is not legitimate," S. cautions "to regard the
modern law of crime as a goal toward which ancient societies were
developing" (131). Therefore, "One can recognize merits and
defects in different systems....but historical inquiry need not
embark on the limitless enterprise of assessing merits and
defects. Its task is to understand" (55). (Cautious as he is,
however, S. cannot erase admiration for the communal procedure of
the Greeks over the centralized character of Near Eastern
justice.)
In developing these theories, S. relies heavily on philology,
citing and discussing the primary evidence fully. Equally
essential to an understanding of justice, in the author's view,
is the comparative and theoretical study of law. He acknowledges
a large debt to H.J. Wolff, E. Ruschenbusch and G. Thuer but his
use of secondary sources is as impressively wide-ranging as his
knowledge of the primary material.
After the scope of inquiry is defined, the discussion turns to
an examination of Greek codes in relation to other ancient
compilations. Chapter three considers the unity of Greek law
while the next two deal with procedure, specifically the
resolution of disputes in Greece generally and, in Chapter Five,
in Athens. The development of compulsory litigation out of a
condition of uncontrolled self-help is convincingly
reconstructed. The book concludes with an excellent summation
that draws together the several threads of discussion, "To Each
his Due or Athenian Procedure Refined," in which Greece is again
counterpoised against Rome and Mesopotamia.
While the book must be read in its entirety to gain an
appreciation of its conclusions, it may be useful to point to a
few of the major findings. Examination of the law codes of Lower
Mesopotamia reveals that they do not consist of prescriptive
rules; when copied on clay tablets, the codes took on a literary
not legal character (33). Evidence from other Near Eastern
cultures leads to similar conclusions. By contrast, the Greek
concept of justice took the form of prescriptive law codes, even
though--as S. cautions--the word "code" is not applicable to the
Greek lists of laws (55): the Greeks did not conceive of law as
a continuum, they had no collective word for a body of law,
equivalent to "ius" (57), and there existed no legal profession.
Concept and procedure alike rested on the Greek view of the
privileged role of individual members of the community rather
than a belief that justice as well as status descended from a
centralized, kingly authority.
In tracing his subject, S. has made an immense contribution to
the field of legal history. Moreover, in taking the large
perspective, his contribution is even more extensive. Like
Walter Burkert, he examines the Greek sphere in its larger
geographical and chronological context, fairly assessing the
notions of each culture. And in looking to the role of members
of the Greek communities, the study becomes a cogent social
history of Greece, probing the status of citizens, metics,
manumitted slaves and women. Since the difference in the Greek
conception is tied to a notion of the individual's relation to
his community, the issue of communal consciousness--the emergence
of the polis--is a central feature of discussion.
The "Homeric Question", too, enters the account: "Homer
composed for audiences who understood the same diplomacy" (100).
S.'s stance on the question of unwritten/written law is
particularly pleasing, at least to this reader. He appreciates
the development from unwritten rules into later forms: "It
follows that adoption was already practised before Solon issued
this law. His law did not make an innovation out of nothing; it
regulated a practice that was already current" (121). Although
some changes may be unavoidable when customs are reduced to
writing, the content is not fundamentally altered.
At the level of specific issues, the account is consistently
excellent. The trail of "dike" (101 ff, 119 ff and 138 ff) stands
out as a prominent example of the care taken with the
presentation of evidence, nature of analysis and construction of
the presentation. The sources, primary and secondary, guide the
discussion. Theories of others are fairly presented and assessed
in a balanced manner but S.'s own position is always clearly
stated.
Reliance on philological evidence demands an abundance of
foreign terms--Latin, Greek, but no cuneiform (!), German and
French primarily, all carefully defined with illustrations that
give the meaning in readily identifiable settings: for example
"recht" may be a body of law or the right of a householder to
plant onions in his front garden (4). Such "homely" definitions
are enhanced by charming turns of phrase: "The language chosen
by Professor Watson is less rhythmical than that of Hesiod, but
both say the same thing. .... it is usually better for men to go
to law than to eat one another" (102).
The book is a model of construction, cohering from start to
finish, within chapters and between chapters. References to
issues treated previously or to be treated subsequently guide the
reader through the entire account so deftly that the book should
be a case study for use in university writing centers.
Sealey openly states his challenge in undertaking the study:
"the rule of law ... is not often defined and it is not easy to
define" (23). The Justice of the Greeks renders at least
the last portion of that statement no longer accurate.