Helleman, 'Eros Unveiled, Plato and the God of Love', Bryn Mawr Classical Review 9508
URL = http://hegel.lib.ncsu.edu/stacks/serials/bmcr/bmcr-9508-helleman-eros
@@@@95.9.16, Osborne, Eros Unveiled
Catherine Osborne, Eros Unveiled, Plato and the God of
Love. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. Pp. xiii + 246.
$48.00. ISBN 0-19-826761-4.
Reviewed by Wendy Elgersma Helleman
-- Erindale College, University of Toronto
whellema@credit.erin.utoronto.ca
With this study of Eros, Catherine Osborne challenges
contemporary and widely held assumptions regarding eros
and agape as two divergent, if not opposing forms of love.
The position articulated by Anders Nygren[[1]] has found a
receptive audience for a number of generations. Osborne's
argument, however, has to contend with more than popularized
Christian teaching, for non-Christian popular understanding of
erotic love is also far removed from the cosmic spiritual bond of
true eros for which she is making her case. Her
rehabilitation of eros proceeds by way of analysis of
ancient and medieval documents, but her work is more systematic
than historical in its attempt to account for divine eros
in human relationships. Her primary thesis is that true love
implies a relationship which cannot be based on either the need
of the lover or the potential benefits to be derived from the
beloved.
She defends her interpretation of "eros unveiled" by an
appeal to the Platonic/Aristotelian philosophical tradition which
has profoundly influenced Christian views of the love of God and
human love. The position is developed in a series of nine
studies which originated as independent studies and could be
considered independently, yet are held together by a common theme
and interweaving of arguments; they do reinforce one another, as
is claimed in the preface (vii). All of them deal with the theme
of love, approaching it in different ways, using text-critical
and literary, or theological, historical and philosophical
analysis; the arguments make frequent appeal to biblical
statements, the history of christian teaching, and teachings of
the church. The variety of approach makes for lively
presentation and keeps the reader's interest, but makes honest
assessment of its accomplishment a more difficult matter.
Osborne sets the stage for this discussion with the first
chapter in which she introduces models from Greek philosophy for
regarding God as both subject and object of love. She challenges
the reader to consider God as a generous-spirited erastes
whose love for the world was not withdrawn after the fall into
sin, and is certainly inexplicable if analysed in terms of what
he might stand to gain from it (22-3). His arrows of love, like
those of Eros, strike without regard to the innate worth or
beauty of the beloved. For God's role as object of eros
Osborne points to Aristotle's unmoved mover who motivates by
being loved (20-1), thereby as it were taking on a feminine role.
Of interest in this discussion is Osborne's realization that this
portrayal of lover and beloved needs to go beyond traditional
Greek dualities of mortal and immortal, human and divine, to take
into account the biblical narrative of original creation, fall
into sin, and redemption in Christ (9-11) for an accurate
qualification of divine love as it characterizes different
situations. Nonetheless, Osborne's intent in this book is to
arrive at a definition of love which transcends all particular
instances of love as it characterizes relationships: friendly,
sexual, romantic, or parental.
The second chapter focuses on the New Testament understanding
of love as agape, providing analysis of the term and its
cognates against the background of Septuagint usage. Osborne
concludes that the ambiguous term "love of God" has three
possible meanings: love for God, love from God, and that inspired
by God (28-9) and can refer to 1) an emotion or feeling, 2) a
type of behaviour or action, 3) a relationship or bond between
two parties, and finally, 4) an external cause of loving
relationships, such as an abstract concept or personification of
"Charity" presiding over relationships. She emphasizes that none
of these meanings threaten our understanding of God's nature as
personal; nor are different kinds of love to be distinguished
according to respective objects, since the various uses of the
word cohere around loving relationships (51).
Recognizing that Origen considered eros and
agape as interchangeable terms for love (73), Osborne in
the third and fourth chapters examines Plato's Symposium
and Lysis (56-61) for a non-acquisitive model in which
love is not motivated by expectation of rewards. Here she most
clearly challenges Nygren's claim regarding eros as
appetitive love, finding support in John Rist's analysis of
Platonism and Neoplatonism[[2]] to argue that there is less
asymmetry between God's love for us and our love for God than
might be supposed (66). Origen's portrayal of love in terms of
unselfish eros on the model of the bride and bridegroom in
the Song of Songs (74-5) is to be understood in terms of Gregory
of Nyssa's threefold analysis of virtue as motivated by fear of
punishment, desire for rewards, or for its own sake, only the
latter being a worthy motive (77-8). To make this claim she
appeals to the portrayal of Socrates as an embodiment of
eros, the philosopher who, as lover, demonstrates the
balance of need and resourcefulness, the two parents of Eros
according to the Symposium myth of his birth and role as
daimon (108-111). Accordingly she argues that the very
desirability of the object of love results from the capacity of
Eros to transform ordinary mortals into philosophers yearning for
what they perceive to be good; beauty is not perceived
independently of love (116).
The next two chapters turn to the contribution of Aristotle in
this tradition of thought. The fifth chapter looks at his
unmoved mover as object of love and ultimate explanation for the
movement of the heavenly bodies. Using Aquinas' discussion in
the Summa Theologica 126-33, Osborne concludes that the
Aristotelian position commits one to attributing life and
consciousness to the stars inasmuch as they are influenced by
God. This discussion is not as clearly relevant to the basic
thesis as that of the next chapter, where Osborne explores
philia, comparing Aristotle's discussion of a politically
or economically qualified cooperative relationship in which
reciprocal contributions were expected (162-3) with that of
Aquinas who recognized that Christian caritas was more
altruistic.
Chapter seven examines use by Clement of Alexandria and Origen
of the term philanthropia for aspects of God's love which
have little precedent in other religions or philosophies: the
incarnation of Christ (175, 177), and the process of God's
self-revelation (165, 176). Hellenistic thought frequently
connected the concept with the ruler cult, referring to
(condescending) interest of the ruler in his less fortunate
subjects. Stoics used the term for divine providence (171-3).
Osborne notes that both Porphyry and Plotinus avoided use of the
term, and thus anticipates a point made in the next chapter
regarding Dionysius the Areopagite's use of philanthropia
to indicate special events undertaken by God on behalf of the
human race (197-9).
Turning to more recent questions of theodicy, Osborne in this
eighth chapter uses Moltmann's discussion of suffering love in
action as limitation on God's omnipotence (186-9), to contrast
Dionysius' discussion of divine love. Apophatic theology leads
the latter to affirm, with Origen, the interchangeability of
eros or agape for divine love. However, Dionysius
does make a clear distinction between downward flowing, creative
love and the kenotic self-emptying love of the incarnation and
atonement (191-2). Osborne differs from Rist in her position
that Dionysius' views are not to be traced back to Proclus and
other earlier Platonists; she argues that when Dionysius speaks
of God's love (as eros) he does not mention the
incarnation (195) since for him it is not part of God's creative
love but reflects humiliation and vulnerability on the part of
God.
Osborne's discussion comes to a climax with the ninth chapter
where she returns to Dionysius' Divine Names to discuss
the meaning of love (eros) when properly used to refer to
a cosmic bond or unifying force (209-10). The attempt made here
to distinguish genuine erotic love from more particularized or
partial love as it is connected with bodily eros most
clearly reveals the philosophical conditions to be met for
accepting eros and agape as fundamentally
indistinguishable when applied to divine love (207-8). According
to Osborne the term eros is used properly only when
applied to unified and unifying divine love; when applied to
partial or divided love at the bodily level it is used in a
secondary or transferred manner.
A concluding chapter brings together the main argument that
love and needy desire are not to be equated; rather, desire for
good things follows on love. Indeed, "the good" becomes
attractive only with the eyes of love (220). In this way Osborne
has attempted to reconstruct the traditional reading, based on
the Symposium, which presents love in terms of desire.
Turning the tables on this tradition Osborne argues that blinded
and whimsical eros promotes a positive perception of those
who in themselves are not lovable. Without eros we could
not recognize God for who he is, nor could he "see in us anything
to merit his attention" (221).
This collection of essays represents a noteworthy effort to
rehabilitate Eros as a symbol of divine love and a cosmic
unifying force which transcends more particularized
relationships. Osborne can certainly count on scholarly support
for her effort to add nuance to the differentiation between
agape and eros as, respectively, Christian and
pagan concepts of love. Indeed, her discussion helps to call
attention to the varied kinds of relationships of love
characterizing Greco-Roman society in antiquity, and is helpful
for understanding the views of Origen and Dionysius. Numerous
features of the argumentation are attractive: the consistent
effort to avoid devaluing love to the level of a prostitution
which focuses on benefits or rewards expected, as well as the
depiction of the blindness of divine love to the inherent worth
of its object, a blindness from which many of us may derive
comfort.
Having said this much, however, we must also examine some of
the implications of this position which are less attractive. In
an arena of discussion which has, as it were, newly discovered
the motivating power of desire against a long tradition
emphasizing reason as the pinnacle of human achievement,
Osborne's spiritualized, if not intellectualized portrayal of
true eros will strike many readers as an attempt to turn
back the clock, refurbishing an antiquated Neoplatonic
understanding of divine love for the present. Osborne's reading
of the texts, and particulary the reinterpretation of the role
and speech of Socrates in the Symposium is crucial to her
position. In the attempt to come to a definition of love which
suits a variety of human and divine relationships equally, I
believe Osborne has underestimated the powerful role of beauty in
the dialogue, and neglected the strong tradition connecting
goodness and beauty, represented in the ideal of
kalokagathia by which the Athenian aristocracy measured
itself. The result of her work is most clearly articulated in the
last chapter which presents divine love as a polar opposite to
bodily love, characterized as particularized and inferior, or
divisive (209); "earthly minded thinkers" can surely demand a
more nuanced discussion of the links between what is more
commonly considered the domain of eros and the domain of
the divine. Yet the presentation here is clearly consistent with
earlier presentations where Osborne also refused to develop
recognizable and legitimate distinctions in love as it operates
in varied fields of human experience, in marriage, the family, or
political and social alliances.
It is my understanding that the different terminology given
for love in the original texts, whether eros,
agape, or philia is precisely significant in this
way, alerting the reader to different factors qualifying the
nature of love in the varied circumstances or stages of human
life, whether we regard the love of a parent for the child,
romantic love or love for a spouse, for a friend, a city or pet
animal. Expressions of love cover the spectrum of human life,
and each kind of love has its own validity. The kind of divine
love identified by Christian mystics of late antiquity was
strongly influenced by an ascetic tradition incorporating
significant aspects of Neoplatonic thought, and accepting the
language of eros to express its love for God; in
opposition to Osborne I would contend that sound Christian use of
such language should not force us to neglect valid application of
a differentiated terminology for love as it functions in the
varied spheres and stages of human life. Sexual expression of
erotic love has its legitimacy, no less than the love of a mother
for her child, or the patriotic love of a citizen for his
homeland. The peculiar jealousy which characterizes such love
must also be acknowledged. The strong emotional intensity and
particularizing focus of such love was the vehicle by which Old
Testament prophets like Hosea expressed God's devotion for his
people and his desire that they remain faithful to him as a bride
to the groom to which she has pledged her love; this imagery is
picked up repeatedly in the NT, especially in Revelation.
And finally the central symbol of Eros. Accenting the
blindness of love has its advantages. There are also clear
disadvantages in representing the generosity of divine love by
appealing to a whimsical use of the arrow of love. Surely the
unpredictability of eros as it arises in this way would
undermine the stability of the love which is desired. Human
beings have real needs, wants, and vulnerabilities. Although
true and lasting love is ultimately not to be qualified in terms
of needs being met, it is also significant that central Christian
teachings do not ignore those needs. To my understanding it is
significant that the biblical portrayal of love depicts it not
only as a relationship which seeks the good, but also a command
to be obeyed. The possibility of such obedience is best
expressed in 1 John 4:19, "We love because he first loved us." A
development of this theme is probably one of the more significant
lacunae in a book which seeks to revitalize an understanding of
divine love in terms of a Christian tradition.
The book has been attractively produced, and benefited from
exceptionally careful proofreading. It is complete with an
appendix on the positions of A. Nygren and G. Vlastos, a
bibliography and useful indices.
NOTES
[[1]] A. Nygren, Agape and Eros (Philadelphia: Westminster
Press, 1953). The work was originally published in Stockholm,
Sweden in two volumes, 1930 and 1936.
[[2]] J.M. Rist, Eros and Psyche, Studies in Plato, Plotinus
and Origen (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964)
70-87, 213-16.