Vernezze, 'Socratic Movement', Bryn Mawr Classical Review 9506
URL = http://hegel.lib.ncsu.edu/stacks/serials/bmcr/bmcr-9506-vernezze-socratic

@@@@95.6.16, Vander Waerdt, The Socratic Movement

Paul A. Vander Waerdt, <i>The Socratic Movement.</i>  Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1994. Pp. 406. $19.95. ISBN
0-8014-9903-8 (pb).

     Reviewed by Peter Vernezze -- Weber State University
          pvernezze@cc.weber.edu

     There is a natural tendency to focus on the Socrates of
Plato in the same way there is a tendency to focus on the
brightest star in a constellation.  Though other portrayals of
Socrates exist, none details so compelling and enigmatic a
figure, nor combines philosophical and literary brilliance, in
quite the manner of a Platonic dialogue.

     But it is always important to keep in mind that not one but
three substantial depictions of Socrates have come down to us
from antiquity.  If preference is routinely given to one, surely
the other two at least merit a hearing before being dismissed. 
However, as Paul Vander Waerdt reminds us in his introduction to
this collection of essays, the alternate portrayals of Socrates
do not often get their day in court:  "it is often assumed,
though the assumption is rarely supported by detailed argument,
that the 'historical Socrates' is identical to the Socrates of
Plato's early, 'Socratic' dialogues" (9).  Clearly, Vander Waerdt
has a point.  When two prominent collections of essays on this
subject can title themselves the philosophy of Socrates and
concern themselves almost exclusively with the Socrates of the
early Platonic dialogues [<i>The Philosophy of Socrates</i> ed.
by Gregory Vlastos (Anchor: 1971); <i>Essays of the Philosophy of
Socrates</i> ed. by Hugh Benson (Oxford: 1992)], the time has
come to expand the perspectives from which we perceive Socrates.
In an attempt to redress this imbalance, Vander Waerdt offers
this collection of essays, which concerns itself not with Plato's
Socrates but with what Vander Waerdt dubs "The Socratic
Movement."  By this term he means, "in the first place...those of
Socrates' associates who attempted to commemorate his life by
recording his conversations for posterity."  However, Vander
Waerdt also understands the Socratic movement in a broader sense
to refer to "the numerous fourth- and third- century
philosophers...who recognized Socrates as their chief authority
and who viewed their own philosophical activity as a continuation
of his" (4).  The first eight essays in this volume are devoted
to a consideration of nonPlatonic depictions of Socrates, while
the second group of six essays are concerned with the influence
Socrates continued to wield in the Hellenistic world.

     Of the two alternate portraits of Socrates, that of
Aristophanes seems the more difficult to resuscitate for several
reasons.  First, Aristophanes' <i>The Clouds</i> is a comedy, and
comedies are not the first place the serious scholar would turn
to derive an accurate depiction of an historical figure.  Second,
the depiction of Socrates in this work seems so at odds with what
we know of Socrates from other sources that we seem compelled to
dismiss it as caricature.  Finally, the Socrates of both Xenophon
and Plato explicitly denies the type of activity that <i>The
Clouds</i> demonstrates him as engaged in.

     In his introduction to this volume and again in the essay
"Socrates in the Clouds," Professor Vander Waerdt confronts "the
widespread consensus among modern scholars that the figure of
Socrates in <i>The Clouds</i> is that of a typical sophist" (56). 
Instead Vander Waerdt argues that the interest in natural
philosophy Socrates demonstrates in the play represents a serious
interest of Socrates at one point in his life:  "the Aristophanic
Socrates, who attempts to explain all natural phenomena in terms
of their material constituents, displays the same philosophical
orientation as the young Socrates of the <i>Phaedo</i>" (66).

     But there are several problems with taking the remarks at
<i>Phaedo</i> 96-100 as expressing a serious interest in natural
philosophy of Socrates at any point in his life.  First is the
fact that the <i>Phaedo</i> is a definite middle-period dialogue,
one of a group in which Plato espouses a set of doctrines found
nowhere in the early works.  Gregory Vlastos has detailed ten
major doctrinal distinctions between the character Socrates in
the early-period and the character Socrates in the middle-period
dialogues, and has argued for the claim that we have good reason
to identify the character of the early period dialogues with that
of the historical Socrates and to ascribe claims of the middle
period dialogues as a Platonic innovation.[[1]]  So when Socrates
questions the immortality of the soul in the <i>Apology</i>, but
argues for it in the <i>Phaedo</i>, on this line of
interpretation we assume that the latter is a Platonic invention. 
In the same way, the discourse on causality in the <i>Phaedo</i>
that Vander Waerdt appeals to in order to justify the Socratic
attraction to natural philosophy seems more likely to represent
Platonic teleology than it does any particularly Socratic
doctrine.

     But even if one does not accept the distinction between
early and middle-period dialogues, there is still reason to be
suspicious of connecting the discourse in the <i>Phaedo</i> where
Socrates speaks of an early interest in natural philosophy with
the depiction of Socrates in the <i>Clouds</i>.  For we need to
keep in mind the explicit denials of Socratic interest in natural
philosophy in both Plato and Xenophon.  Xenophon says flat out
that Socrates "did not enquire in the same way as most of the
others concerning the nature of the universe, how the
cosmos...was born, and by what causes each of the heavenly things
comes into being" (<i>Memorabilia</i> 1.1).  In the
<i>Apology</i>, Plato has Socrates explicitly confront the
Aristophanic portrayal of him as a natural philosopher and reply
unequivocally, "But I have nothing to do with such things
gentlemen.  I appeal to most of you to bear me out, and I ask you
to inform and tell another...whether any of you have ever heard
me conversing about such things, whether much or little"
(<i>Apology</i> 19d). Probably written shortly after Socrates'
death and read by those at the trial, it seems implausible that
such a denial would have been fabricated whole cloth by Plato, or
that if Socrates had issued such a challenge it would not have
been met by someone at the trial had there been any truth to the
charge.

     Against this line of reasoning Vander Waerdt raises the
specter that the very fact that Socrates and Xenophon felt
compelled to combat such a portrayal argues in a way for its
accuracy, since "it was open to them to dismiss it as a parody of
the typical sophist with whom Socrates shared little or nothing"
(57).  But the argument that both Xenophon and Plato "protest too
much" about Socrates' involvement in natural philosophy is
specious.  For it is clearly possible for the charge to have been
baseless but for it to have taken hold in the minds of the
public.  (That is, unless we are to believe the Athenian demos
had a taste for accuracy that is at odds with the American
public's.)  If such were the case, then there is nothing
remarkable in Plato and Xenophon having to confront a charge
which, though groundless, was taken seriously by their fellow
Athenians.

     A much more likely prospect for resurrection is Xenophon's
Socrates, and no one has done more to revive Xenophon's
reputation than Professor Donald Morrison.  In a seminal essay
published in Ancient Philosophy ("On Professor Vlastos'
Xenophon," <i>Ancient Philosophy</i> 1987, 9-23) Professor
Morrison effectively counters Gregory Vlastos's arguments that
Xenophon's Socrates is inferior to Plato's.  In the essay in this
volume "Xenophon's Socrates as Teacher," Professor Morrison
continues the rehabilitation of Xenophon by focusing in
particular on the portrait of Socrates as a teacher in both
Xenophon and Plato.  Not only is Xenophon's depiction of Socrates
as teacher consistent with Plato's, but in at least one important
area, Morrison argues, it is more intellectually honest.
1. Although Xenophon's Socrates is often depicted as a
philosophical lightweight who eschews philosophical argumentation
in favor of simplistic moralizing, Morrison demonstrates, by
focusing on the examination of <i>Euthydemus</i>, that "Xenophon
considers subjecting people to the elenchus to be an essential
part of Socratic method" (188).
2.  The role of moral exhortation to others exists in both
Plato's and Xenophon's portraits.  Morrison argues that like his
Xenophontic counterpart "Plato's Socrates must also give moral
advice" (191).  As evidence "that Plato's Socrates is the sort of
person to give moral advice" (192), Morrison cites the
<i>Crito</i>, which depicts Socrates as arguing for a positive
moral position, namely, that he must remain in jail.  One cannot
imagine, Morrison claims, that if the situation were reversed
Socrates would not attempt to lead Crito to the same solution.
3. Both Plato and Xenophon depict a Socrates concerned with
providing practical advice to the young.  In Plato this activity
is not depicted but is referred to, especially in the early parts
of the <i>Laches</i>, while "Xenophon's Socrates also showed
concern with (<i>Mem</i>. 4.7) and claimed expertise in
(<i>Apo</i>. 20-21) these educational matters" (194).
4.  Finally, although both Plato and Xenophon have Socrates deny
being a teacher of virtue, "Xenophon stresses more than Plato the
importance of Socrates' moral character and its influence for our
overall moral evaluation of the man" (208).  On this point,
Morrison concludes "Xenophon's portrayal provides an important
supplement, and corrective, to Plato's account" (208).

     Vander Waerdt's collection of essays performs an admirable
service in opening up pathways of interpretation which are too
often closed and giving voices to viewpoints which are too often
unheard, and for these reasons can be enthusiastically
recommended.


NOTES

[[1]]  For a justification of the distinction between early and
middle dialogues see Chapter 2 of Gregory Vlastos's <i>Socrates:
Ironist and Moral Philosopher</i> (Cornell University Press:
1991).