Kirby, 'Therapy of Desire. Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics', Bryn Mawr Classical Review 9503
URL = http://hegel.lib.ncsu.edu/stacks/serials/bmcr/bmcr-9503-kirby-therapy
@@@@95.3.14, Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire
Martha C. Nussbaum. The Therapy of Desire. Theory and Practice
in Hellenistic Ethics. Martin Classical Lectures, New Series,
Volume 2. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. Pp. xiv +
558. $29.95. ISBN 0-691-03342-0.
Reviewed by John T. Kirby -- Purdue University
Even for those with some knowledge of ancient philosophy,
which in realistic terms may mean no more than 'Small Plato, and
lesse Aristotle,' the realm of Hellenistic philosophy likely
represents today an uncharted and darkling terrain. This is
certainly a sign of the times, and while it is convenient to
round up such likely suspects as sloth, and a general Hesiodic
declension of the race, it is also prudent to remember that the
contours of knowledge are themselves changing. While we still
have only the same number of hours in our day as the scholar of
two hundred years ago had, there is now by contrast exponentially
more to be known--about everything from classical antiquity to
fiber-optics--and the total mass of human knowledge continues
literally to double and redouble (it is estimated) every few
years. This I take to be both a cause and an effect of
professional specialization. Too, there are (whether we like to
admit it or not) fashions in classical scholarship. Less than
twenty years ago I asked a professional Latinist whether he liked
to read the tragedies of Seneca. His reply: 'Sure--when I want a
good laugh.'
One can see, then, how it might come to pass that
Hellenistic philosophy has of late received rather less than its
due in terms of scholarly attention. Happily this is beginning to
change,[[1]] and quite recently there has been substantial good
work in the realm of ethics; for example, Brad Inwood's Ethics
and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford 1985); Phillip
Mitsis' Epicurus' Ethical Theory: The Pleasures of
Invulnerability (Ithaca 1988); and Malcolm Schofield and
Gisela Striker (edd.), The Norms of Nature: Studies in
Hellenistic Ethics (Cambridge 1986). A recent issue of The
Monist has also been devoted to Hellenistic Ethics,[[2]] and
Nussbaum herself edited an issue of Apeiron on the same
topic.[[3]]
Hellenistic philosophy, we learn from Nussbaum's lengthy
programmatic introduction to The Therapy of Desire, 'is
hard to study partly on account of its success one must deal,
in effect, with six centuries and two different societies' (6).
Nussbaum has decided to shape her investigation around a nexus of
themes stemming from a central metaphor, that of philosophy as 'a
way of addressing the problems of human life' and of the
philosopher as 'a compassionate physician whose arts could heal
many pervasive types of human suffering' (3). The metaphor, whose
appearance Nussbaum traces in the three major Hellenistic
schools, has deep roots in Greek thought; it is to be found in
Homer's Iliad and in the Presocratics. While not perhaps
specifically medical in focus, the notion of 'care of the soul'
appears at least as early as Plato (epimeleisthai tes
psukhes, e.g. Apology of Socrates 29d 30b). Nussbaum
wastes no time in revealing one of the startling implications of
the medical metaphor--that philosophy-as-therapy deals not only
with cognitive but also with affective issues: not just with
'invalid inferences and false premises' but also with 'irrational
fears and anxieties excessive loves and crippling angers' (37).
A key aspect of this--and thus of Nussbaum's whole enterprise
here--is the Hellenistic assessment of the emotions as 'not blind
surges of affect' but 'intelligent and discriminating elements of
the personality that are very closely linked to beliefs, and are
modified by belief' (38). Nussbaum asserts that the same is true
of desire: hence her book's title.
Not surprisingly--given Nussbaum's own training and
predilections, as well as the nature of the matter at hand--she
begins her study by grounding it in Aristotle (chapters 2 3). The
Maestro di color che sanno himself, as Nussbaum shows in
chapter 2, drew explicit parallels between philosophy and
medicine;[[4]] moreover (though Nussbaum is careful to distance
herself from postulating a genetic link between Peripatetic and
Hellenistic thought) both Aristotle and the Hellenistic thinkers
construed ethics in relation to 'human flourishing' (Nussbaum's
term for eudaimonia). In chapter 3 Nussbaum firmly
underscores the notion, already fairly widely accepted, that
Aristotle posits a cognitive origin to the emotions. But she also
points out that his ethical theory places great emphasis on
external factors in one's life, particularly good luck in terms
of family and friends, upbringing, health, and so on. She
compares such philosophy, finally, to giving vitamins to the
healthy, rather than healing the sick (101)--thus pointing up a
major difference between Aristotle's approach and that of the
Hellenistic philosophers.
From this point on, the book follows in its main contours a
structure similar to that of Long's Hellenistic
Philosophy: a sizeable section on Epicureanism, a chapter on
Skepticism, and another sizeable section on Stoicism. In her
treatment of Epicureanism (chapters 4 7) Nussbaum focuses on the
Epicurean approach to erotic passion, the fear of death, and
anger. Chapter 4 evokes a vivid picture of life and education in
the kepos of Epicurus. Nussbaum's Epicurus is surprisingly
up-to-date in some respects; for example, he valorizes 'the
testimony of the senses and the bodily feelings' (107). On the
other hand, he also harbors the notion of some normative and pure
phusis, 'nature,' that can be appealed to and capitalized
upon, as if nomos were not (to pirate Pindar's felicitous
phrase) ho panton basileus. Ironically, the Aristotle that
Epicurus is said to counter is not the immemorial logocentrist
perpetrator of the western tradition, but a relativist whose
dialectic respects 'the beliefs of the elite whom it
interrogates, and [turns] these social dogmas, through a sort
of critical scrutiny, into "truth"' (104). The philosophy of
Epicurus is unblinkingly focused on eudaimonia, and
consequently is unapologetically therapeutically-oriented; for
him, 'every branch of philosophy must be assessed for its
contribution to practice. If it makes none, it is empty and
useless' (121). Thus, for him such apparatus as logic have a
sheerly instrumental value.
Lucretius is of course a crucial source for the
reconstruction of Epicurean doctrine, and so it is not surprising
to find that chapters 5 7 are devoted to the De rerum
natura. Chapter 5 treats at considerable length the Lucretian
attitude toward love; in this Nussbaum has plenty of antecedents,
including (in this century) Cyril Bailey, E.J. Kenney, David
Konstan, and Diskin Clay. Much information is laid out before the
skilful summation, synthesis, and assessment found on pp.
188 191. Chapter 6 provides a detailed examination of death and
the doctrine of the mortality of the soul. Here the power,
profundity, and grave beauty of Nussbaum's summary of the problem
(pp. 192 193) make one hope that she will someday turn to the
writing of fiction; rather than rend the fabric of that prose by
citing an excerpt, I will simply urge my reader to peruse it
in situ. The argument in the remainder of the chapter is
exceedingly complex, and Nussbaum interacts with the opinions of
a number of other scholars. Chapter 7 investigates Lucretius'
teachings on those 'monsters of the soul,' anger and aggression.
Here Nussbaum investigates an aspect of what I have elsewhere
termed the 'Great Triangle,'[[5]] particularly the
peitho/bia dyad; her chapter title, 'By Words, Not Arms'--
a translation of Lucretius' dictis, non armis (De rerum
natura 5.50)--makes this clear.
For the eighth chapter's treatment of Pyrrhonian Skepticism-
-a radical approach that proposes 'the purgation of all cognitive
commitment, all belief, from human life' (285)--Nussbaum draws
mainly on Sextus Empiricus. She believes, like Burnyeat, and
pace Frede, that for the Skeptics, epokhe--that
suspension of reason in which one turns away from belief--extends
to all beliefs (but not to all emotions; cf. p. 495). The
ataraxia that follows upon this does so by chance, 'like a
shadow' (300).
Chapters 9 12 then turn to Stoicism, and here we see that
the therapy of desire is Stoicism's central focus in ethics.
Nussbaum examines Stoic therapeutic strategies, especially the
self-governing and critical powers of the psukhe. Chapter
9 explores some of the differences in approach between Stoic and
Epicurean thought: for example, while both schools stress that
the individual who comes for philosophic therapy is in a dialogic
relationship with others, in Epicureanism this is with the
philosophical/therapeutic community as a whole, while in Stoicism
it is more specifically between master and pupil. Moreover, while
in the latter case the relationship is symmetrical and
non-authoritarian, the structure of relationships in the former
is much more hierarchical. Chapter 10 assesses the Stoic
recommendation that the passions be extirpated. Nussbaum finds
this problematic, as it is based on an undifferentiated notion of
the psukhe (unlike that propounded by Plato). In this
regard the Posidonian model is favored over the Chrysippean. The
connection between belief and emotion, and the role played by the
former in the latter, is carefully explored.
Chapter 10 ended with the assertion that, if the Stoic
position on the passions is accurate, then 'it is only in the
Stoic life of self-containment that we can have stable gentleness
and beneficence, the avoidance of terrible acts' (398). To pursue
this exploration further, chapters 11 12 provide an examination
of Seneca's De ira and Medea.
In conclusion, chapter 13 gives some summarizing
'reflections about several themes that link the book's various
chapters and sections' (485). Here Nussbaum provides a
retrospective assessment of such topics as Hellenistic views of
nature; the extent of ataraxia; the implications of
Hellenistic philosophy for economics, politics, and social life
in our own time; and, finally, the extent to which a real
extirpation of the passions can be successful.
The Therapy of Desire, then, while extensive in breadth,
does not pretend to the status of a systematic overview of
Hellenistic philosophy. Rather it is a 'somewhat idiosyncratic
account of certain central themes' (6) inspired by the medical
analogy. Aware of the pitfalls that typically beset such studies,
Nussbaum makes it clear that she does not consider it sufficient
simply to raid extant Roman sources in order to reconstruct
vanished Greek ones (6 7). On the contrary, 'good Roman Epicurean
or Stoic philosophy must at the same time be a searching critical
inquiry into Roman traditions This book is committed to
studying the philosophical arguments in their historical and
literary context' (7). Nussbaum early makes clear her commitment
to (what I think are) sound historicist interpretive principles:
' Roman philosophy pursues its questions about the relation of
theory to practice while standing in an intimate relation to
Roman history and politics' (7). In doing so she invokes Wolfgang
Iser's notion of the 'implied reader.'[[6]] Nussbaum gives a
clear rationale for the literary shape of her philosophical
investigations:
Literary and rhetorical strategies enter into the methods
[scil.the philosophical methods of the Hellenistic
schools] at a very deep level, not just decorating the arguments,
but shaping the whole sense of what a therapeutic argument is,
and expressing, in their stylistic concreteness, respect for the
pupil's need (486).
While Roman authors are given respectful attention, one
might still wish that Nussbaum had addressed more thoroughly
certain Roman social institutions, such as marriage; the footnote
on p. 187 merely raises the question and whets the appetite.
Certainly there has been a significant amount of good work done
recently on such topics.
Nussbaum is sympathetic to her subjects, but not slavishly
so. She notes, for instance, that the Hellenistic philosophers
were 'far more inclusive and less elitist in their practice of
philosophy than was Aristotle' (10). And she is enthusiastic
about the enduring practical value of their thought:
' the Hellenistic focus on the inner world does not exclude, but
in fact leads directly to, a focus on the ills of society. One of
the most impressive achievements of Hellenistic philosophy is to
have shown compellingly and in detail how specific social
conditions shape emotion, desire, and thought.' (11)
But she is quite ready to take judicious exception to a number of
the central tenets of Hellenistic philosophy. She is not
comfortable with the Hellenistic notion that eudaimonia
flows from a reduced attachment to the unstable elements of the
world (what the ancients called ataraxia,
'not-being-distressed'),[[7]] and she attempts to explore the
extent to which the therapy-model is dependent upon this notion.
She points out that the Epicurean model of therapy may make the
student/patient progressively more dependent on the system
itself, and thus 'less adept at reasoning for herself' (136). She
wonders whether Lucretius might not carry the notion of
autarkeia--self-sufficiency--too far: 'Is this the
attitude of a cured lover, or is it simply a new form of the
disease that Lucretius' therapy was supposed to cure?' (191)
Because of the deep connections of anger with love, Nussbaum
finds the project of extirpating the passions to be largely a
failure (509). She does not shrink from an assessment of 'some of
the potentially more problematic methodological consequences of
using therapy as a norm' (491). None of the three major schools
is immune to this critique.
One innovative aspect of Nussbaum's approach is to envision
the education, in each school in turn, of an imaginary ancient: a
woman (and a courtesan) named Nikidion. This characteristically
nussbaeumlich device is intended to 'make readers
attentive participants, until her encounters become their own'
(45). By virtue of her gender and social class (both of which
will change, although I will leave it to the reader to discover
how and why!), Nikidion's tutelage becomes an index of how, and
to what extent, the Hellenistic approach to philosophy achieves
its therapeutic goals.
Nussbaum carefully explains her rationale for the
translation of technical vocabulary (e.g. 15 n. 5, 102 n. 1, 269
n. 37, 310 n. 47, 317 n. 2, 319 n. 4, 495 n. 12). The book is
finely printed and bound, and less expensive than many others its
size. I noticed few misprints, particularly for a book of this
size. On pp. 5 6, for techniques du soi read de
soi; on 45, for 'until her encounters become her own,' read
(as I think, and have printed supra) 'their own'; on 49,
the reference to Iliad 9.503 should actually be to line
507; on 119 n. 37, Lathe Biosas should have Lathe;
on 295, read 'then<,> burdened'; on 483, read 'then<,> I retell';
on 522, for Exercises spirituels, read Exercices.
Karl Marx's doctoral dissertation, listed on 524 as Marx 1841 and
on 121 n. 41 as Marx 1854, dates from 1841 but was apparently not
published until 1927.
Overall, then, this book is a weighty achievement, worthy to
take its place with the other volumes of the august Martin
Classical Lectures series, and, I think, likely to play a
significant role in the rehabilitation of Hellenistic philosophy
in our time.
NOTES
[[1]] The standard comprehensive introduction is still A. A.
Long's Hellenistic Philosophy (Berkeley 1974, 2nd ed.
1986). The two-volume general sourcebook edited by A. A. Long and
D. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge
1987 1988),will be indispensable for a long time to come, but
there is also an attractive selection (in translation) entitled
Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings
(Indianapolis 1988) edd. Brad Inwood and Lloyd Gerson. Two
related subfields that have received attention recently are
epistemology and the philosophy of mind: e.g. M. Schofield et al.
(edd.), Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic
Epistemology (Oxford 1980); J. Annas, Hellenistic
Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley 1992); J. Brunschwig and M. C.
Nussbaum (edd.), Passions and Perceptions: Studies in
Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge 1993); and some of
the essays in S. Everson (ed.), Epistemology (Cambridge
1990). The interested reader will also want to consult J. Barnes
et al. (edd.), Science and Speculation: Studies in Hellenistic
Theory and Practice (Cambridge 1982), and the (mostly
newly-translated) Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy of J.
Brunschwig (Cambridge 1994). I see too that Garland Publishing
has announced an eight-volume series of hefty essay-collections
under the editorship of Terence Irwin, the eighth of which is
entitled Hellenistic Philosophy.
[[2]] The Monist 73.1 (January 1990), edd. John Hospers and John
Cooper.
[[3]] Martha C. Nussbaum (ed), The Poetics of Therapy:
Hellenistic Ethics in Its Rhetorical and Literary Context
(Apeiron 23.4 [December 1990]).
[[4]] The topic had been previously explored by Werner
Jaeger,'Aristotle's Use of Medicine as Model of Method in His
Ethics,' Journal of Hellenic Studies 77 (1957) 54 61.
[[5]] John T. Kirby, 'The "Great Triangle" in Early Greek
Rhetoric and Poetics,' Rhetorica 8 (1990) 213 228, now
reprinted as pp. 3 15 of Edward Schiappa (ed.), Landmark
Essays on Classical Greek Rhetoric (Davis 1994).
[[6]] Wolfgang Iser, The Implied Reader: Patterns of
Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett
(Baltimore 1974).
[[7]] The reader may be amused, or bemused, to learn that
hydroxyzine hydrochloride, which is prescribed both as an
anti-pruritic and as an anti-anxiety agent, is marketed by
Roerig/Pfizer as 'Atarax.'