Bussanich, 'Stoics on Ambiguity', Bryn Mawr Classical Review 9503
URL = http://hegel.lib.ncsu.edu/stacks/serials/bmcr/bmcr-9503-bussanich-stoics
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Catherine Atherton, The Stoics on Ambiguity. Cambridge
Classical Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Pp. xix + 563. $89.95. ISBN 0-521-44139-0.
Reviewed by John Bussanich -- University of New Mexico
Chrysippus' famous dictum "every word is by nature
ambiguous" serves well as an appropriately open-ended motto for
this excellent book. One could frame an inquiry about ambiguity
much more narrowly than Atherton has done, but scholars with any
reason to consult the book will be grateful, I think, that she
has chosen to exclude little that has a bearing on the topic.
Atherton explores in exhaustive detail the role of ambiguity in
virtually every domain of Stoic thought: moral psychology,
epistemology, grammar, semantics, logic, stylistics and rhetoric,
philosophical method, and the principles of classification. The
systematic character of Stoic philosophy itself justifies this
thorough search for interconnections and cross-currents, though
Atherton is careful to raise tough questions about the coherence
of the Stoic use and application of the concept in each area. A
second factor broadens the scope of this investigation beyond
these already wide boundaries. Because the roots of the Stoic
theory reach deeply into earlier philosophers, especially
Aristotle, Atherton's project amounts almost to a history of the
subject in ancient thought.
Atherton boldly aims this study at an amazingly wide variety
of scholars: classicists, Hellenistic philosophers, philosophers
of language, theoretical and comparative linguists, and
historians of logic. Besides the ancient authors and the
classicists who study them readers should be prepared to
encounter contemporary figures like Chomsky, Frege, Lyons,
Scheffler, and Saussure for detailed comparisons with Stoic and
ancient theories generally. Classicists will be relieved that
Atherton never allows her extensive knowledge of contemporary
linguistics or philosophy of language to tempt her into making
tendentious or anachronistic judgments. But given that
comparisons between ancient and modern theories are inevitable
and even desirable, Atherton succeeds brilliantly in employing
contemporary thought to reveal both "the uniquely Stoic
motivation behind the classifications" of ambiguity as well as to
point out the limitations of Stoic conceptions, e.g., the extreme
narrowness of their grammatical concepts and categories.
Noting the fuzziness and vagueness of the concept of
ambiguity, as well as disagreements between ancients and moderns
about whether ambiguity is a good thing or not, Atherton observes
that ambiguity is "very much what you make it." The Stoics did
make a great deal of ambiguity because "seeing or missing an
ambiguity could make a difference to one's general success as a
human being." The substantial third chapter (91 pages, adroitly
titled "Morality Talks: The Origins and Limits of Stoic Interest
in Ambiguity") properly emphasizes the practical, ethical focus
of Stoic philosophizing; provides a detailed summary of the
central aspects of Stoic philosophy from the perspective of Stoic
logical and linguistic theory; and shows precisely how making the
wrong decisions, viz., assenting incorrectly to the impressions
one receives, can ruin one's life and make one unhappy. A case
where ambiguity plays a crucially important role in moral
reasoning is the category of the preferred indifferents, objects
of choice that are morally neutral, e.g., health and wealth. If a
person does not disambiguate goods into moral goods and non-moral
preferences, the Stoics argue, one inevitably will end up
miserable. This splendid chapter is too vast in scope and rich in
detail to be summarized, but I call special attention to the
nuanced comparisons of Stoic ideas with the linguistic and
dialectical theories of Aristotle and Epicurus; incisive analyses
of Stoic views on literary style and on the concept of clarity;
and convincing explanations of their relative lack of interest in
semantic multivalence. One shortcoming is a rather brief and
somewhat vague account of why the Stoics did not even notice
Aristotle's pervasive use of homonymy, particularly in his
concept of "focal meaning" or pros hen equivocity.
Chapters 4 and 5 provide detailed commentaries on three
short but highly significant texts. Chapter 4 examines the only
explicit definition of ambiguity attributed to the Stoics,
a brief passage in D.L. 7.62. Atherton skilfully tracks the
possible meanings of amphibolia among the notions of
ambiguity, vagueness, non-specificity, and metaphor. Considerable
assistance in the search for definitions comes from Diodorus
Cronus who made the striking claim that there is no such thing as
ambiguity. Chapter 5 compares two classifications of ambiguities,
one explicitly ascribed to the Stoics, the other an eclectic
blend of Stoic and non-Stoic elements. Atherton presents freshly
edited versions of these important texts along with precise,
readable translations. The first comprises the final chapter of
Galen's short On Linguistic Sophisms. Galen reports Stoic
views on ambiguity merely to supplement what he considers the
more comprehensive classification of linguistic fallacies in
Aristotle's Sophistical Refutations. Atherton shows how
Galen's notorious hostility against the Stoics blows up in his
face: Stoic semantic and syntactic theory is more innovative and
sophisticated than Aristotle's, but Galen seems to be unaware of
the fact. A somewhat longer classificatory scheme is preserved
in Aelius Theon's teaching rhetorical handbook the
progymnasmata (Preliminary Rhetorical Exercises).
These two taxonomies comprise the superstructure for the
200-page chapter 6, the heart of the book. A substantial section
is devoted to each of six species of ambiguity: common
ambiguities, homonymies, elleipsis and pleonasm,
significant/non-significant part, hyperbaton and interpolation,
and reference. This part of the book will most profitably be
consulted as a reference work. Each section begins with the
relevant passages from Galen and Theon, usually accompanied by
pertinent Aristotelian texts. In addition to the linguistic
topics other major topics discussed include Stoic criticism of
the Platonic theory of forms; Stoic views on Platonic and
Aristotelian dialectic; the Stoic theory of autonymy discussed
and reworked in Augustine's de dialectica; and a general
Stoic theory of signs that is prominent in Augustine's de
magistro, a work that, interestingly, also contains a version
of the "use/mention" distinction.
Chapter 7 takes up one of the major roles assigned to
ambiguity by the Stoics: the creation of fallacies or deceptively
persuasive arguments. Discerning and removing ambiguities is
crucial for the Stoic project of attaining rational and moral
consistency. The Stoic treatment is rooted in Aristotle's more
comprehensive discussions, but Atherton properly emphasizes the
importance of paradoxes (e.g., the Sorites or "heaping" argument)
and puzzles as additional motivating factors. Of particular
interest here is the contrast between Stoic commitment to the
effectiveness of logic and dialectic and sceptical attacks on its
value, especially that of Sextus Empiricus.
In the final, eighth chapter Atherton discusses how Stoic
ideas fit into the larger world of ancient rhetorical and
grammatical theory. Her conclusions are necessarily tentative
since most of the Stoic texts were already rare in antiquity and
most that was distinctive in Stoic grammatical theory lived on
only in epitomes and commentaries. Atherton's study is a
significant contribution to our understanding of ancient literary
theory in large part because it is so successful in retrieving
and interpreting carefully the limited amount of textual material
that survives. Philological rigour and sensitivity are combined
with an enviable command of contemporary linguistic theory and
philosophy of language.
Two editorial features of this volume warrant comment. No
need to highlight the production values: as always Cambridge
University Press offers an admirable, flawlessly printed book.
Atherton is to be commended, first, for exceptionally thorough
documentation of the countless textual references that are
inevitable in a large study of Hellenistic philosophy. She
provides the standard von Arnim SVF references, of course, but
even more helpful to non-specialists--but, regrettably, uncommon-
-is the inclusion of references to the appropriate sections of
The Hellenistic Philosophers by A. A. Long and D.N. Sedley
(Cambridge University Press, 1987). Second, and more important,
the volume is endowed with a whopping 35 pages of indexes, an
absolute necessity in a work of this kind, but, nevertheless, an
essential tool that is too often absent.