Lavelle, 'Tyranny and Political Culture in Ancient Greece', Bryn Mawr Classical Review 9502
URL = http://hegel.lib.ncsu.edu/stacks/serials/bmcr/bmcr-9502-lavelle-tyranny
The following review was original distributed, both in paper and
e-versions, lacking the first paragraph. The gopher archive has been
corrected and this now is the correct and complete version. The editors
apologize to Professors Lavelle and McGlew.
James F. McGlew, Tyranny and Political Culture in Ancient
Greece. Cornell University Press, 1993. Pp. ix, 234. $31.50
ISBN 0-8014-2787-8.
Reviewed by B.M. Lavelle -- Loyola University Chicago
McGlew's work is divided into six chapters which trace the
genesis, decease and aftermath of Archaic tyranny through this
"language of representation." In "Tyrannus fulminatus:
Power and Praise," McGlew, on the basis of a Flavian age
declamatio, argues for a perceived Greek polarity between
founders and tyrants and "the (post-tyrannical) city's mastery
over their stories, both of which are basic to a polis's
political identity and its conceptions of sovereignty" (50). (I
shall return to this.) Chapter Two, "Justice and Power: The
Language of Early Greek Tyranny," focusses on dike and its
implication with rulers from Homer. Having no real concern for
dike, Homeric kings were self-absorbed with honor and
vengeance; leaders contemporary with Homer and Hesiod, on the
other hand, were responsible for the community's welfare, most
especially the preservation of justice. When these were deemed
to have perverted justice, a way was opened for tyranny. The
oracles involving Kypselos of Corinth (Herodotos 5.92b.2-e.2)
demonstrate that his tyranny's claimed initial object was to
correct the injustice of the city's leaders, an object shared by
other tyrants. These claims established a right to rule, but,
ultimately, the tyrant's dispensing of justice could itself seem
arbitrary, unjust and in need of its own correction. In "The
Lawgiver's Struggle with Tyranny: Solon and the Excluded
Middle," (the book's best chapter in my judgement despite its
treatment of the so-called Solonian laws on tyranny and
stasis), McGlew argues that Solon, who diagnosed tyranny's
causation and aimed to inure the Athenian polity, sought to
preempt the tyrant's claim to possess sole authority to correct
injustice and thus to short-circuit the process by inserting
first himself, then the adamant rule of law. Solon's reforms
failed because the Athenians rejected his solution, opting
instead for the autocratic correction of Peisistratos. As
"lawgiver," Solon occupied a mid-ground between "tyrant" and
"founder," sharing the power of the former, but, unlike the
latter, leaving only his laws as memorial. Chapter Four, "Master
and Slave: The Fall of Tyranny," attempts to demonstrate that
later Archaic tyrants dissembled for their constituents, striving
to survive in a changing political environment. Increasingly
unpopular, tyrants sought to preserve their autocracies by
masking their power and reinventing themselves (in, say, the
manner of Gelon [Diod. 11.26.5-6]): "...as their claims to be
reformers of injustice became gradually less persuasive, tyrants
joined their enemies at a costume ball of autocratic images:
disguising themselves as founders or even liberators, they sought
to prolong their power by pretending to be anything but what they
were" (6). The case of Maiandrios, the successor of Polykrates,
shows that the roles of "tyrant" and "liberator" were linked:
poleis, acquiring the power of the former, appropriated
the latter title (e.g., Athens through the "popular version" of
the tyrannicide). In "Narratives and Autonomy: Greek Founders"
(in many ways, a reprise of themes developed in Chapter One), we
learn that foundation stories, invented for the most part, helped
secure the polis' political existence. "Viewed as
political analogy, the founder's quest to overcome domestic crime
or illegitimacy articulated the colony's own distinct history of
autonomy" (169). Such political language could serve both as a
tool of self-rule or subjugation and so attracted tyrants who
employed it for their own ends. A "founder's mask" could not,
however, disguise a tyrant. Finally, in "Lovers of the City:
Tyranny and Democracy in Classical Athens," McGlew argues that
tyranny's freedom functioned at Athens as a conceptual model for
the idea of citizenship. Indeed, personal and passionate as
though based on eros (cf. Thuc. 2.43.1 [Perikles'
Funeral Oration]), Athenian citizenship was conceived upon
the "language of tyranny," as fifth and fourth century documents
and literature (tragedy, philosophy) illustrate.
The author makes several useful points, albeit rather
obliquely. He notes at the outset that tyranny cannot have been
other than a partnership between rulers and ruled for as long as
it lasted; it was not something worked out exclusively within
the ranks of the aristocracy nor was it achieved or maintained
merely by force. That is undoubtedly correct, for Archaic
tyranny was commonly conceded. Second, tyranny unquestionably
bequeathed many of its aspects to government and leadership
subsequent to its dissolution, especially at Athens where tyranny
and democracy were strongly linked. It is not for nothing that,
among other things, Herodotos states that Kleisthenes redivided
the Attic tribes in emulation of his namesake, the tyrant of
Sikyon (5.67.1) (I shall return to this consequential point);
that ostracism's initial victims were the "relatives" of the
Peisistratidai, some of whom had achieved high political standing
before Marathon (Ath.Pol. 22.4-6); that Perikles was
likened by Thucydides to a tyrant (cf. 2.65.8); or that
democracy's most significant political office was the
strategeia (see below). "Tyranny," for all of the
Athenians' official fear and loathing, was a sustaining pier upon
which the edifice of Athenian "democracy" was founded: tyranny's
"destruction"--i.e., Marathon--was also its recreation as a
perpetual defining antithesis which provided ideological
nourishment for the "democracy" as long as it lasted. Finally,
McGlew shows that distinctions between "tyrant," "lawgiver,"
"founder," etc. were not infrequently blurred. (I also return to
this.)
While the language involving tyrants/tyrannies is an important
topic for investigation, McGlew's thesis of tyrants'
"self-representation" is unconvincing because it is poorly based
upon the evidence and mostly speculative. The author fails to
confront head-on the problem of source-valuation, the thesis'
basis and linchpin, and instead combines, excludes, interprets
and omits without rating the evidence or stating a rationale;
many of his interpretations and conclusions are dubious as forced
or unsupported. He says, for example: "The popular story of the
Cypselids' rise was reported in somewhat different versions by
Herodotus and Nicolaus of Damascus, who borrowed from the
fourth-century world-history of Ephorus" (61). Why is it the
"popular story" and, if it is, why are there differing versions?
Is it the "popular version" of the seventh, sixth, or fifth
centuries? What, if any part, is factual? Why? Herodotos'
testimony, accepted uncritically, will not do, for his accounts
relied upon intermediary reporters whose information and views of
tyranny and its purported "language" were, at the very least,
"interested." At Athens, accounts of Peisistratid tyranny were
filtered through an official hostility which can only have had a
deforming affect upon the tradition about the tyrants. (Really,
how are Herodotos' personal experiences with tyranny and Athens'
collective attitude toward it in the fifth century to be excluded
as influential of his reporting of tyranny in general?)
Herodotos' political nuances are of the fifth century B.C. after
all, not of the seventh or sixth. Nikolaos of Damaskos, even if
he relied upon Ephoros, cannot do: he is no better than his
sources, the best of which could not antedate the fifth century.
These he seems to have altered anyway for the purpose of his own
emphases and technique; his terminology in regard to "tyranny"
may well have been his own.[[1]] Why, after all, should we
believe that any source later than the sixth century preserves
even an approximately accurate memory of Archaic tyrannical
"ideology"?
More to the point, what Archaic tyrant's "language of
self-representation" have we? If as McGlew concedes, the
post-tyrannical polis was the ultimate judge of tyranny,
if it must exercise control over its "stories," then "tyranny"
can only have been fundamentally affected by an inveterate
revisionism which sacrificed truth to expediency. Even evidence
deriving from "eye-witness" accounts requires circumspection.
Solon and Alkaios are hardly "lenses" by which to view the
overall relationship between tyranny and constituency in the
Archaic period. (Was Solon categorically or momentarily opposed
to tyranny and certain candidates? He is said ultimately to have
made his peace with Peisistratos.) Apart from epinikian poetry,
whose political content is problematical (cf. McGlew, 37, n. 48),
we possess far more contaminating "reaction" than contemporary
"representation." In fact, I cannot locate a single instance of
a tyrant's "self-representation" in this study. McGlew's
uncritical deployment of obviously affected source-material and
omission or sidestepping of contrary or infelicitous evidence all
but eliminates the thesis' credibility and undermines his
somewhat contradictory conclusions. I surmise that this lack of
critical method stemmed from an over-devotion to the theoretical
superstructure of the work which subordinated the evidence to it:
"...I attempt to show that the individuals who appear prominently
here-the Cypselids, Solon, the Peisistratids, Maeandrius of
Samos, the Deinomenids, and the fifth century Athenians-believed
and wanted others to believe that they were following a
script..."(8). Perhaps that is why a full chapter is constructed
upon a Flavian period declamatio, while the unprecedented,
extremely significant use of the term tyrannis by
Archilochos in the seventh century B.C. is accorded only a few
perfunctory remarks. Yet even if the authority of contemporaneity
were to be conceded to the "evidence" adduced, the power that
McGlew claims for such artificial political language and its
potential for successful misrepresentation defies credibility:
actions made and sustained tyrants, not words; and the Greeks
themselves made emphatic distinctions between erga and
logoi. The "script," after all, is McGlew's.
In Chapter One, as an example, McGlew adduces that
Quintilianic oratorical exercise for schoolboys (post A.D.
90[[2]]), in which the burial of tyrant struck by lightning in a
city's forum (= agora), the founder's honored resting
place and polis' center, is at issue. A diobletos
should be entombed on the spot as religious convention required,
but a tyrant's body must be cast beyond the borders because of
violating polis law; to bury a tyrant proximate to a
founder was unthinkable under normal circumstances because it
defiled the city's sacred area, but also because it negated the
positive values of citizens/citizenship. For McGlew, this debate
depicts a polarity between founders (and their stories) and
tyrants (and theirs) in which the polis' politically
sovereignty is articulated. Foundation legends, he states, were
likely retold in social and cultural contexts defined by
cult,[[3]] and contain conspicuous similarities (e.g., single
founders,[[4]] Delphic support, founder's city becomes the
colony's metropolis[[5]]) which are central to a city's
sense of political identity. In retelling these stories, the
city could safely recall autocratic power without affirming its
political viability and, in so doing, define itself as
beneficiary. The tyrant, to the contrary, could not be so
honored, since that would pervert the city's narrative
self-representation by causing it to yield control over its
history and sovereignty. For the tyrant must needs be classed
"happy" in the event, his public purpose fulfilled, but the
polis' identity confounded. In a subchapter on Pindar,
Bacchylides and their patrons (more aptly titled "Spin-doctors of
Antiquity"?), McGlew contends that epinikian poets ("praise
merchants") appropriated the power of praise from the community
and asserted control over their audiences' judgement of their
patrons. The poets' methods and assertions betray the tyrant's
fragility, who despite such efforts could not in fact control the
polis' ultimate decision. In a narrative reversal, the
founder and tyrant ultimately changed places: the former, though
unhappy in life, was deemed happiest in death; the latter,
securing happiness only fleetingly, was "rewarded" with
execration.
McGlew's scheme of ultimate "happiness" and "wretchedness," is
contradicted by several examples; tyrants were in fact
prominently buried intra fines: the world of the
declamatio is unreal, the polarity imagined. Herodotos
(5.92.2z) notes that Kypselos, olbios by prophecy,
"finished the web of his life well." Unless he invented it, that
information will have derived from--and so abided with--the
Corinthians of the third quarter of the fifth century[[6]] (see
below on Periander). The same "good fortune" is implied in
Peisistratos's case who is said to have "died an old man still
tyrant" (Thuc. 6.54.2): again, the memory, preserved by the
Athenians of the fifth century, implies that he, too, was
"happy." In fact, the Athenians' recollection of Peisistratos as
war-hero (Hdt. 1.59.4), descended through at least two
generations officially hostile to tyranny, suggests that P. was
remembered and appreciated more for his role as general than
condemned for being tyrant: cf. Hdt. 1.59.6 and below. Neither
ended his life "as the image of injustice" (172). To the
contrary of McGlew's thesis, Archaic, even Classical Greek
attitudes toward tyrants are very unlikely to have hardened into
the dramatic, indeed, the structuralistic opposition he suggests:
tyrants were recognized as "founders" in fact and entombed in
agorai and their powers remembered. Battos of Kyrene
(Hdt. 4.155 ff.) was acknowledged by the Kyrenaians as
founder and ruler, was not imagined or "projected ... into
(the founder's) space" (174), did not "appropriate" the image:
his tomb was in the agora (Pind. Pyth. 5.93) and
his royal prerogatives (TA\ GE/REA), used optimistically by a
descendant as a basis to claim the same, were initially conceded
to him by the original colonists and then, for some time, to his
progeny by their descendants.[[7]] The same status was accorded
Miltiades III, oikistes of the Thracian Chersonnese, who
was chosen (elected?) tyrannos by his fellow citizens
(Hdt. 6.36.1) and whose prerogatives were passed intact to
Stesagoras II and then to Miltiades IV: his founder's cult will
have recollected his autocratic rule (6.138.1). How then is it
possible summarily to deny that there were other oikistai
who functioned simultaneously as tyrants (and not merely in a
"tyrantlike" way)? McGlew glosses Battos' dual role as founder
and monarch in fact (cf. 173); his inadequate explanation of
Miltiades (cf. 179, n. 50) omits consideration of Herodotos
6.34.2 wherein Miltiades was designated oikistes, by the
Pythia (though inexplicitly), but not by himself. He was
recognized as such by the Dolonkoi and the accompanying colonists
well before his departure for the Chersonnese and, of course,
afterward in perpetuity, when they formally established his cult.
As "tyrants" functioned as "founders" in fact and not
simply in "word," so were "tyrants" (recalled as) "lawgivers."
The "father of Athenian democracy," Kleisthenes, a "lawgiver"
(cf. Ath.Pol. 22.1), could nonetheless be likened by
Herodotos, a friendly source, to his tyrant-grandfather in the
very act of formulating the democracy. We are obviously invited
to make comparisons as Herodotos had certainly been, for he had
obtained the information on Kleisthenes from Athenians, perhaps
even the Alkmeonids. Thus was Kleisthenes "represented" to
Herodotos by Athenians of the fifth century and to us as
tyrannical by Herodotos; that is how his actions seemed to the
historian. What political power then attaches to the "language"
of tyrants if, well into the fifth century, the relatives of the
creator of Athenian democracy, the "first citizen" of the
democracy, noted his tyrannical ancestry and thus invited
comparison of democracy's founder to a tyrant? McGlew glosses
this, saying Kleisthenes "...reformed Athens neither as a tyrant
nor a lawgiver.." (120), which is to ignore the implications of
both sources and the Athenian memory of him as grandson of the
tyrant of Sikyon.[[8]] Such inveterate blurring of distinctions
(not "limited crossovers" as McGlew, 182) was not confined to
Athens, for Greeks generally seemed to have had mixed memories of
and feelings about tyrants and tyranny, not unexceptionably
negative ones. Several tyrants were, as McGlew points out, noted
for wisdom: Periander and Pittakos were ranked among the Seven
sophistai not by themselves, but partially because of
their perceived roles as lawgivers like Solon (on Periander: cf.
Diog. Laert. 1.40-42; Salmon, 197 ff.; on Pittakos: Diog.
Laert. 1.76-77).[[9]] Periander's "depravity" was part of a
hostile tradition, yet a cenotaph remained in Corinth apparently
through the Classical period (in which he is called
prytanis, not tyrannos) marking his grave
there: Diog. Laert. 1.97 (= Anth. Pal. 7.619);
cf. also [Simonides], Anth. Pal. 13.26; Larcher II,
176-77. Pittakos was an Homeric-type hero in his fight against
Phrynon (Strabo 599-600; Plut. Mor. 858a-b).
Notwithstanding his "membership" in the Seven Sages and popular
election, Pittakos was the object of negative doggerel, dating,
it would seem, to his own time (Plut. Mor. 157d-e);
retiring, he successfully "got down from tyranny" and, when he
died, the Mitylenaians apparently consecrated his homestead holy
ground (cf. Plut. Mor. 858b; Diog. Laert. 1.75). A mixing
of traditions, reflecting the Greeks' contradictory (not neutral)
regard of tyranny, varying by source, time, and circumstance,
surely accounts for all of this.[[10]]
Other criticisms might be levelled by chapter, but I shall
keep to Chapter Two as characteristic: 1) judges are BASILH=ES
(not BASILH=S as McGlew [57]) in Hesiod (Erga 38-39) and
gerontes in the Iliad's "Shield-scene" (18.503-6);
Nestor is both a geron (1.286) and a basileus
(2.54) as apparently are other Achaian chiefs (cf. 2.53), yet
McGlew denies any (including, I presume, implicit)
presence of Homeric kingship in the "Shield-scene" in order to
force distinction between Homeric kings and Homeric/Hesiodic
ones.[[11]] 2) Archilochos F 126 W hardly "transforms Hesiod's
dike into a personal code of honor" (60): his statement
possesses an Homeric overtone (cf. McGlew, 59). 3) In view of
the prophesied tenure of Kypselos' dynasty (Hdt. 5.92e.2), it is
to be demonstrated why the Kypselid-oracles, as the argument of
Sokles (not "Sosikles" [sic McGlew 61 ff.]: cf.
OCT apparatus; Macaulay; Powell; Marg; etc.) against
Hippias' return (Hdt. 5.92.a1-h5), could not have been invented
any time up to their appearance in Herodotos.[[12]] 4) "An
undiscriminating, arbitrary, and apparently senseless force" for
McGlew (65), the olooitrochos that is Kypselos will,
according to the Greek, fall precisely upon the "monarch-men," no
others. 5) Doubt about Pittakos' formal election as
aisymnetes (80) conspicuously disregards the testimonium
of that very Nikolaos of Damaskos who reported the "popular story
of the Kypselids' rise," in which he describes a voting procedure
involving Epimenes, elected tyrant of Miletos (FrGrHist
90, 53): AI)SUMNH/THS U(PO\ DH=MOU XEIROTONEI=TAI. (The
Athenian demos' vote of a bodyguard of astoi to
Peisistratos and the Megarians to Theagenes rendered them de
facto aisymnetai and, taken altogether, suggest that
the procedure involving Pittakos was not unique. The Athenians'
memory of their vote is, of course, quite significant.) 6)
"Youthful judge" (or "noble youth who is the measure of his
fellows") appears to be simply tendentiously wrung from KOU=ROS
AI)SUMNH/THR (Il. 24.347) (80-81): Aristarchos understood
aisymnetes to be equivalent to basileus (cf. Erbse,
581-82), a synonym for tyrannos.[[13]] 7) Peisistratos
could hardly "have begun his tyranny with conspicuous acts of
retribution" (77), since a) his main enemies survived in strength
to oust him a short time later, b) the korunephoroi were
astoi and their minions anyway, and c) the Athenians
recalled Peisistratos as conspicuously law-abiding. 8) A
SKH=PTRON (OT 811) is not a "club" (cf. McGlew 76, n. 53),
but, perhaps, a "walking stick" (sic McGlew 78, n. 58),
which, while it might be used to club (76, n. 53), was neither a
korune nor a rabdos, as the author implies.[[14]]
9) McGlew interprets the prophecy of Hipparchos' (not
Hippias' [sic McGlew, 84]) dream completely disregarding
other, stronger possibilities: cf. How and Wells, II (1912) 25):
"...apparently Hipparchus is encouraged to bear his fate with
fortitude, sure that his murderers (not himself: sic
McGlew) shall pay the penalty for the evil deed."
In my view, McGlew's most significant omission is the role of
war-leadership in tyranny's genesis. As a rule, early Greek
tyrants played critical roles in military affairs, facts
repeatedly underscored in our sources. Pheidon and Pittakos were
war-leaders; Kypselos' rise may be connected with Pheidon's
expansiveness towards Corinth, with the loss of Kerkyra or
perhaps with ongoing hostilities with Megara; Theagenes became
tyrant while Megara warred with Athens. Peisistratos' success in
that war is cited by Herodotos as an immediate cause for his
popularity and for the award of a bodyguard, which lead forthwith
to his first tyranny (Hdt. 1.59.4; cf. Ath.Pol. 22.3).
Miltiades was asked to come to the Thracian Chersonnese and was
made tyrant because the Dolonkoi were "especially hard pressed by
war" (Hdt. 6.34.1). Successful war-leadership, one imagines,
might have been parlayed into titles and images ("shield" or
"city-preserver" or such like) and a reputation for military
success implying redoubtability once established could, with
scant effort, be transformed into one of indispensability, though
the crisis had evaporated. The concession of tyranny for
war-leadership by politai, aristoi and demos
concurring, is thus more in line with Sarpedon's manifesto on
prerogative (Il. 12.310-21; cf. McGlew, on Gernet) and
with the prehistoric political shifting of leaders sketched in
Athenian myth (Ath.Pol. 3).[[15]] (Perhaps that is why
the subject is avoided: McGlew [72] actually redefines Kypselos'
polemarchy [Nik. Dam. FrGrHist 90 F 57], implying that its
nature was fundamentally civilian.) The main indication of the
abiding political importance of the strategeia is its
investiture with supreme political power after the foundation of
democracy at Athens.
Tyranny and Political Culture in Ancient Greece is
neither history, historiography, nor hard political science. It
might best be considered a structuralizing meditation on the
nature of early Greek tyranny, which presents some interesting
ideas pertinent to the subject of Archaic Greek politics. And
the author is to be commended for his zeal and ingenuity: the
language involving Archaic tyranny is certainly an important
topic. His lack of rigor in respect of source-evaluation,
however, renders his treatment of the subject unsound, his thesis
and conclusions implausible and unpersuasive. In stating a methodology
for the study of Archaic tyranny, which, unfortunately, he abandons at
the outset, McGlew succinctly summarizes the book's shortcomings:
"Only by sifting with minute precision through the large bulk of
lore that attached to tyrants and the biased assessments of those
who followed them is it possible to discover the rational"--and I
would add "and the irrational"--"basis of their support" (2). As
a study of representations of and responses to early Greek
tyranny, self-aware of the perspective and attitude of its
sources, allowing its thesis to unfold from careful evaluation of
the evidence available instead of apparently superimposing it,
this might have made a substantial and lasting contribution.
NOTES
1. M. Toher, "On the Use of Nicolaus' Historical Fragments,"
CA 8 (1989) 159-172; cf. J. B. Salmon, Wealthy
Corinth (1984) 190.
2. M. Winterbottom, The Minor Declamations Ascribed to
Quintilian (Berlin, 1984) xv.
3. The "likelihood" is not supported by evidence. McGlew
further asserts that foundation legends "suppress more
information than they preserve about colonization" (18). If
these were of the significance claimed by the author, we should
expect more rather than less information. Its absence argues
against foundation legends' centrality in the collective memory
and for non-ritual preservation of such stories (perhaps by
gene: cf. Hdt. 4.162.2).
4. In his list of plural founders recollected, contradicting his
"rule" of "one founder-one city" (pp. 18-19 and n. 8), McGlew
omits Akragas (2: Thuc. 6.4.4) and Himera (3: 6.5.1); he
mentions Trachinian Herakleia (3: Thuc. 3.92.5) on the following
page.
5. McGlew's conjecture, that the Athenian origin of Theokles,
oikistes of Sicilian Naxos, was invented "to support
fifth-century Athens's interest in extending hegemony westward"
(21, n. 14), is groundless, but also contradictory. How did his
name intrude into the tradition so as to exclude the legitimate
founder's?
6. I am unsure what weight should be attached to Nik. Dam.
FrGrHist 90, F 60 describing the punishment of the
Kypselids, since it corresponds to Athenian formulae for
punishment for capital or polluting crimes (cf. Thuc. 1.126.12;
Plut. Sol. 12.4; Mor. 834a-b). Nikolaos' account
of the rise of Kypselos shares other Athenian features,
suggesting that these may have become generic in later works
about tyrants a) in lieu of information about tyrannies elsewhere
and b) in view of Athens' strongly anti-tyranny tradition. The
author (131-32) accepts Nikolaos without comment.
7. I. Malkin, Religion and Colonization in Ancient Greece
(Leiden, 1987) 205, interprets the further lines of Pindar to
mean that the other kings of Kyrene were also buried inside the
city, an extraordinary honor, which while not the agora is
still extremely auspicious.
8. Cf. W. Eder, "Political Self-Confidence and Resistance: The
Role of the Demos and Plebs after the Expulsion of the Tyrant in
Athens and the King in Rome," in T. Yuge and M. Doi, edd.
Forms of Control and Subordination in Antiquity (Leiden,
1988) 470; T. Rapke, "Cleisthenes the Tyrant Manque," AHB
3 (1989) 47-51.
9. Salmon (1984) 200, notes the similarity between the sumptuary
laws of these "tyrants" and the "lawgivers," Solon, Zaleukos, and
Charondas.
10. Cf. Eder (1988) 469: "One may say that Peisistratus could
well have been regarded as a second Solon in the eyes of the
demos. ... Both of them actually provided tyranny."
11. One cannot say categorically that war-leaders are not
implicitly present in the "Shield-Scene": we note that the
Nestor is sometimes submerged in his account of warfare between
Pylians and Epeians (Il. 11.670-736).
12. Cf. McGlew, 70: "...the consistent presentation of tyranny
in all three oracles is more important than their date and
attribution...".
13. On aisymneteia see D. Hegyi, "Der Ursprung der
Aisymneteia," Acta Classica 13 (1977) 7-10.
14. According to Pausanias (5.18.2), Dike strikes
Adikia with a R(A/BDOS, not really a club (cf. McGlew, p.
77) and possibly even as light as a switch.
15. Of course, war-leadership is fundamental to Roman
dictatorship.