Bloedow, 'Ein neuer Kampf um Troia. Archaeologie in der Krise', Bryn Mawr Classical Review 9502
URL = http://hegel.lib.ncsu.edu/stacks/serials/bmcr/bmcr-9502-bloedow-ein
@@@@95.2.18, Zangger, Ein neuer Kampf um Troia
E. Zangger, Ein neuer Kampf um Troia. Archaeologie in der
Krise. Munich: Droemer Knaur, 1994. Pp. 352. ISBN
3-426-26682-2.
Reviewed by Edmund F. Bloedow -- University of Ottawa
Although Zangger has very little positive to say about
Schliemann, he appears to emulate him at least in having the
Prefaces to his books written by eminent scholars.[[1]] In
Ein neuer Kampf um Troia, Z.'s virtues are, according to
Davis, that he "describes and justifies what in the natural
sciences is called 'the great unifying theory,' that at the same
time explains the collapse of the Mycenaean, Anatolian and Near
Eastern cultures" at the end of the Bronze Age (9). This becomes
possible because Zangger allegedly combines the theoretical
approach of the New Archaeology with the advantages of being a
scientist--i.e., in this instance, a geologist. Add to this the
fact that Z. does not confine himself to some tiny corner of the
archaeological turf, but ranges over the entire Mediterranean.
Finally, he is said to have rendered an enormous service to
Mediterranean prehistory, by drawing attention to the potential
importance of Western Anatolia in the final, internationally
important phases of the Bronze Age.
A closer examination of this study, however, reveals a
rather different picture. One of the first striking features of
this book is Z.'s bold move of attempting to put Troy at the very
center of an over-arching theory--at a time when the new
excavations at the site are under way, with new, significant
results coming to light in each new season. In other words, he
runs the risk of his conclusions being overtaken by new
information. That is precisely what has already happened.
In following what appears to be a latest trend--i.e.,
preoccupation with the 'Crisis Years' (1200-1180), Z. seeks to
link Troy with the center of events--within the broad framework
of a synthesis of the entire Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean.
Accordingly, he begins with a section on "Prehistory in
Perspective: An Attempt to reconstruct Events at the Time of the
Trojan War". This includes a discussion of "the Crisis Years"
(13-16), followed by a brief survey of "the Sources" (16-17),
which leads into a terse overview of "Previous Interpretations"
(18-19). The "bisherige Auswertung" is criticised, on the ground
of not being based on adequate evidence or a faulty approach to
that evidence--namely, "a medley of mute walls and sherds, and
legends that have been endlessly studied but are unreliable, as
well as written sources" (18). Part of the problem has been
overspecialization and fragmentation within the discipline--into
such isolated branches as Prehistory, Archaeology, Classical
Archaeology, History of Art, Ancient History, History, Classical
Philology, Philology, Linguistics, Oriental Studies and
Egyptology--to mention only a few. As a result, one has failed
to see the wood for the trees. On the other hand, there have
been repeated attempts to explain the end of the Bronze Age in
terms of single causes. In recent times the most popular have
been the Sea Peoples, volcanic eruptions, climatic changes and
drought. In such instances, however, no explanation has hitherto
been found to clarify just what set off the chain-reaction
of upheavals that led to the collapse of Bronze Age cultures from
the Aegean to the Eastern Mediterranean. It is Z.'s object in
this study to resolve this problem--i.e., to explain the 'Crisis
Years' (19).
This of course appears to be very different from what the
title, and indeed also the subtitle, imply. None the less, Z. is
persuaded that a new approach is required in order to understand
the interconnection of historical events. It is therefore
necessary to look at events in their totality, and simultaneously
take into account all the regions involved. For this, he draws
on a multiplicity of sources, of varying historical value--but
not as approached hitherto, for the currently prevailing approach
is bedeviled by fundamental error.
His approach will be to "trace the sources back to their
origin, and then test them in respect of their trustworthiness
and what they have to offer" (20). This appears to imply a
re-evaluation of all the primary evidence relating to the
whole of the Bronze Age, to the whole of the Mediterranean. In
such a wide-ranging study, however, one can scarcely expect
one individual to be able to assess all the
primary evidence. Indeed, it soon becomes evident that
Z.'s conclusions are based almost exclusively on
secondary, and at times even tertiary, sources.
And by casting his net very wide, he hauls in a multifarious
medley, whose quality varies enormously. For instance, he brings
to the debate for the first time, in particular, Plato's
Timaeus and Critias, as well as Dictys Cretensis
and Dares Phrygius, and other Mediaeval Homeric 'romances'
(68-74). For Z., the accounts of the Sea Peoples, contemporary
documents, the Homeric epics, ancient authors, legends,
extra-Homeric literature, all compete essentially on a level
playing field: broadly speaking, they can all be approached as
"half true and half untrue" (74-75). The modern critic must
therefore decide where the truth lies. How? Referring to the
ancient sources, Z. notes, acknowledging the existence of
discrepancies: "differences in the reliability of the historical
texts depends on the varying interests of a given author" (75).
One fears that much the same principle is at work in Z.'s case.
He does claim that sources can be tested, and accepted as
reliable, by discovering whether one source agrees with other
sources and/ or with archaeological evidence (76). In most
cases, however, he does not carry through with this principle.
Rather, citing Nancy Sandars on viewing things from a
satellite-like vantage point,[[2]] he maintains that once one has
"established the basic structure of things, most of the details
fall into place to produce a harmonious overall picture" (20).
Given the title of Z.'s study, it is not surprising that he
begins with Troy. Central to his re-interpretation so far as
North-West Anatolia is concerned, is the size of what goes
under the name of 'Troy'. The misuse of this term, however, as
well as associating incorrect 'events' with it, has plagued the
true understanding of its fall. On the contrary, "if one had but
approached 'Troy' with unpreconceived ideas and regarded the
place as one of several Bronze Age cultures (not too
insignificant, but at the same time not too mighty), the problems
associated with the change from the Bronze Age to the Iron Age
would probably have long since been resolved" (80).
In the discussion which follows (80-117), the principal
object should ostensibly be to demonstrate the real size of
'Troy'. Initially, the only evidence seems to derive from
superficial observations by travellers in the late Middle Ages
(82), followed by a review of later travellers, whose concern was
not the size but the location of ancient Troy. The actual size
of Troy is not, however, established. Instead, Z. moves on to
examine the role which Troy played in events at the end of the
Bronze Age. The first step in arriving at an objective
assessment of this problem is "a correction of the terminology
used hitherto". Accordingly, he proposes, for Troy I-V,
"Hisarlik (I-V)," for Troy VI and VIIa, "Ilion VI and VIIa," for
Troy VIIb and VIII, "Ilion (VIIb) and (VIII)," and for Troy IX,
"Novum-Ilium (IX)" (99). Needless to say, this is not based on
any new evidence, nor does Z. explain on what grounds it is
'objective'.[[3]] Instead, he embarks on a survey of Troy within
the framework of its archaeological history (99-116). This is
actually a fairly standard review. Rather than demonstrating
from it the thesis with which he begins, he identifies one of the
outstanding problems today: "we do not know how large the late
Bronze Age city of Ilion was or how large the area over which
Troy had direct political control or over which it exerted
indirect economic influence" (116). All he can suggest is that
the political and economic importance of Troy has hitherto been
underestimated. In other words, we are essentially back at
'square one'.
Z. then turns from Troy to Egypt, and a survey of it and his
other four areas making up the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean
(Central Anatolia, Crete, the Greek mainland and
Syria/Palestine). The object of this comprehensive survey is to
show how the Trojan War was part of a "Weltkrieg". The crucial
cornerstone in Z.'s re-interpretation is the political
organization of the west coast of Asia Minor. He is certain that
here, in the "westanatolischen Kulturkreis" or "troianischen
Kulturekreis", we have to do with, not a single, tightly
organised political entity, but a number of moderately-sized
states which sometimes competed, sometimes co-operated--of which
Troy and Arzawa were probably the largest. At the same time, he
sees them as having formed a "westanatolischen Allianz" (67).
Even bolder is the idea that the 'troianischer Kulturkreis' is
the home of the Ahhiyawa, who, in turn, are the Sea Peoples.
The initial conflicts in Egypt and in the Hittite kingdom so
weakened these two 'super-powers,' militarily, that the situation
must have been an invitation to the countries of the
'wesanatolischen Allianz' to lead an attack against the East
(216). For this, the Alliance devised a new strategy--namely,
not to launch a frontal attack against the Hittites, but to
despatch troops to Cyprus, and then to Syria, with the object of
carrying out a pincer-movement from there against the Hittites
(217). It is about this time that Hittite engineers allegedly
helped the Mycenaeans to build their massive fortifications
(206-7). Indeed, the political climate was opportune for
co-operation between the Hittites and the Achaeans, chiefly on
the initiative of the former--because of threats from without: to
the East, Assyria, and to the North, Kaska. At the same time,
there was to the West of Hatussa of course the 'westanatolischen
Allianz'--a threat to both Hittites and Achaeans (207-9).
This ties in with the Trojan Wars. According to Z., there
were two Trojan Wars: the first, reconstructed chiefly on
the basis of such un-notable sources as Dictys Cretensis and
Dares Phrygius. (By contrast with these authorities, Homer is
treated much more critically (cf. 222-23). This Trojan War took
place at the time of Troy VIh (Ilion [VIh]), and was initiated by
the Greeks, as an act of revenge because the Trojans had (at the
time of the Voyage of the Argonauts) refused the Achaeans passage
through the Dardanelles. Thereafter, Priam, who immediately
rebuilt the walls of Troy, on a much larger scale, became much
more aggressive. Priam was actually spoiling for a fight
(191-98).
Meanwhile, the strategy of the 'westanatolischen Allianz' in
the East so took the Hatti and the Egyptians by surprise that
Ramses III and Suppiluliuma II recorded in official inscriptions
this event orchestrated by the Ahhiyawa, or Sea Peoples (217).
One of the puzzles hitherto has been why the so-called Sea
Peoples were unable, after their enormous success, to take
advantage of Egypt's weakness and why they did not stay longer in
Syria. But if one identifies the Sea Peoples with the states of
Western Anatolia, this dilemma also finds a solution.
In order to resolve the current conflict, however, one had
allegedly to deal with the Sea Peoples at the source. The only
possibility of completely defeating the armies of western
Anatolia would be to launch an attack on centers of the
'westanatolischen Allianz' along the east coast of the Aegean.
Enter the Achaeans! Enter the second Trojan War, which
was fought at the end of Troy VIIa (Ilion [VIIa]) (222-26)! The
Trojan War could therefore be seen as an important historical
event, an act of retaliation against the Sea Peoples, presumably
because they had attacked the Hittites, an ally of the
Mycenaeans. Troy would thus become a key player on the
international scene and an important factor in world events.
This is a bold, and on first sight, highly ingenious theory.
On closer examination, however, it comes up more than wanting.
Much, of course, depends on Z.'s crucial cornerstone--his
'westanatolische Allianz'. In an effort to establish its
existence, he amplifies as follows. Comparison of three text
genres (Homer's Iliad, the accounts of the Sea Peoples and
Hittite texts) for the first time reveals agreement on certain
points: 1) At the end of the 13th century an Alliance came about,
composed of about two dozen states along the East coast of the
Aegean between Thrace and Lycia. 2) All three sources describe,
in different ways, the conflict between the Alliance and other
states in the Eastern Mediterranean. 3) In both the accounts of
the Sea Peoples and the Hittite texts we find the geographical
designation, "to those belonging to the islands," as a way of
identifying the sphere of influence of this new power in western
Asia Minor. 4) Both these sources also reveal that the new enemy
harbored interests in both Cyprus and Syria. 5) Archaeological
evidence indicates that at the beginning of the 12th century
there was a wave of destructions--originating in western
Anatolia, and from here spreading eastwards (76). If the matter
were in fact so simple, Z. would not now be publishing his book.
Nor does he later cite specific references from the different
sources to demonstrate the above assertions. As it is, just
about everything is oversimplified, or does not stand up to
scrutiny.
For instance, according to the legend upon which Z. draws
for developments after Troy VIh, Priam rebuilt Troy (VIIa) on a
much grander scale than what it was hitherto. The archaeological
evidence for Troy VIIa, however, reveals a much more modest city
than Troy VI. (Z. himself places "the greatest prosperity of the
city between 1700 and 1200 BC [Ilion VI]" [111].) Nor is there
any detailed discussion of the chronology of Troy VI and VIIa,
although these are in fact crucial to his re-interpretation.
Furthermore, although Z. offers a plausible picture of friction
between East and West, he does not provide a convincing
explanation why precisely Troy, seen as the architect of
the conflict,[[4]] would want to initiate such a major military
campaign at precisely this time. Nor is any compelling
explanation given why the Achaeans would want to become involved
in a struggle that, according to Z., must include the whole of
coastal Asia Minor from Thrace to Lycia, i.e., 'ganz
Westanatolien'--other than that the homeland of the 'Ahhiyawa,'
or the Sea Peoples, should be destroyed. One can scarcely
imagine that the Mycenaeans would be so naive as to want to lure
such victorious aggressors back from the East to confront them in
battle. Moreover, the location of the 'Ahhiyawa' in North-West
Anatolia is still far from secure.
A further illustration of how Z. works is one of his
attempts to identify the Sea Peoples with the Trojans. In his
subscription to a liberal drawing of a man from one of the tribes
depicted on the pylon of the temple of Ramses III at Medinet Habu
Z. speculates freely. Although there are no vowels in Egyptian
writing, he readily renders Tkkr as the Teuker, "the term
commonly used in Greece after 1200 for the Trojans". This,
together with their similarities to the people wearing feathered
crowns, leads him to speculate further: "if the Tekker really are
the Teucrians, and if at the same time they are fashionably
depicted as wearing feathered crowns, the problem of the Sea
Peoples would be resolved" (81). Well, yes--perhaps! This is
not an isolated instance (cf. his identification of the
Drdny [183-84]--without any independent confirmation,
which Z., however, demands in other contexts.
Nothing less than astonishing is Z.'s confident claim that
between 1260 and 1240 one can localize three important episodes
in Greek mythology"--the expedition of the Argonauts, the Trojan
War, and the attack of the Seven against Thebes (189). He gives
an overview of each of these episodes, which for him contain much
more than a large kernel of truth, but without discussing any of
the problems raised by each of them, especially in respect of
chronology.
Elsewhere Z. refers to "an extraordinary economic boom [in
Mycenaean Greece] in the 14th century". The only evidence which
he cites for this, however, is "Mycenaen pottery--and ostensibly
its precious contents--found on virtually all coasts of the
eastern and central Mediterranean" (188-89). But he says nothing
about quantities or types or shapes, and the contents are to date
unknown. Nor does he suggest what the Mycenaeans may have
obtained in exchange for these items.
Z. prefers Bohemia as the source of tin (105, 188), but for
this he does not offer any evidence--apart from "a 'Cypriot
needle' of electrum found in Hisarlik IIh" (105-06). But how a
'Cypriot needle' demonstrates, that "already at an early date
Troy had close connections with the Danube region and central
Europe" in terms of tin trade remains enigmatic.
A great deal more could be said by way of critique, but the
above observations are enough to show that Z.'s re-interpretation
is essentially a case of a house built on sand.
The lack of rigour is not, however, restricted to the way in
which he advances the basic tenets of his thesis. It will
suffice to point out a few other deficiencies.
In connection with Egypt, no distinction is made between a
high and a low chronology. (The phenomenon is not even
acknowledged; there is in fact very little detailed
discussion of chronological problems anywhere in the book, and
yet these are crucial.) At the outset the highest value is
ascribed to the ancient texts bearing on the Sea Peoples
(16), but later their usefulness is questioned (28-29). In one
instance, Z. uses a book on objects in the Museum in Cairo as an
authority for reconstructing an Egyptian temple, rather
than specialised research on architecture (31). In view of the
availability of specialised and more recent excavation reports,
it seems strange to cite Raban on the trade implications of the
Ulu Burun shipwreck (104 n. 253). As noted above, Z. first
outlines his approach of tracing sources back to their ultimate
origin (20), but in proceeding to a new interpretation he
frequently traces the source back only as far as a scholar whose
interpretation he favours (32 n. 34). Indeed, Z. is very
eclectic in both the ancient evidence and the modern research
which he uses. For important details on Egypt he sometimes
cites, not Egyptologists, but specialists in other domains.
Moreover, at one point he draws heavily on S. von Reden's recent
study for Ugarit (Ugarit und seine Welt , 1992) but then,
for information that "a hierarchically organized feudal society
supported the king of Ugarit," he suddenly cites Astour's study
of twenty years earlier, although for this he could have cited
von Reden just as well. Otherwise, it is remarkable to find
Hoffner (1992) cited for the end of Ugarit but not of Hatussa,
and Muhly (1992) and Singer (1987) cited for the end of Hatussa
but not Hofner (37).
Z. is predisposed to accept the decipherment of the Phaistos
Disc--namely, as bearing a West Luvian dialect (ostensibly a
letter from a Great King of Anatolia to an Achaean ruler), the
Lukka-Land of Hittite documents; this "West Luvian dialect could
easily be the or one of the languages of the cultural region of
West Anatolia/ Troy" (61-64). It does not seem to occur to Z.,
however, that the absence of similar symbols at Troy as those on
the Phaistos Disc constitutes something of a problem for such an
interpretation. At all events, the Phaistos disc has no bearing
on his principal thesis.
For the possibility that 'Troy' stood for 'the land of the
Trojans,' Z. cites "Meyer 1975, 169" (297 n. 244), but 'Meyer
1975' does not appear in the Bibliography. Blegen is credited
with having found skeletons in Troy VIIa, but for this Z. does
not cite Blegen's publication, rather "Page 1959b, 29" (298 n.
297), but no 'Page 1959b' is to be found in the Bibliography.
For the Coarse Ware ('Barbarian' pottery) found in Troy VIIb and
elsewhere, Z. cites Muhly, who, whatever his expertise in other
fields, is not an authority on 'Barbarian' pottery. For the
destruction of Troy by Fimbria in 85 BC, Z. cites, not the
relevant ancient source, but "C.B. Rose, 'The Post-Bronze Age
Excavations at Troy,' Studia Troica 2 (Mainz 1992),
44"--which seems to imply that the evidence for this event a)
rests on archaeological excavations, and b) has only just come
to light. This is extraordinary, to say the least. Z. also
points out that Doerpfeld discovered a weak spot in the
fortifications (195). For this, he cites, not Doerpfeld's
publication of his excavations, but "Robert von Ranke-Graves,
Griechische Mythologie (Hamburg 1992), 588". Numerous
other examples of this type could be cited.
The most important result of Z.'s study is that in the end
'ein neuer Kampf um Troia' does not in fact emerge--at
least, there is no new Trojan War.[[5]] When Z. maintains
that in his re-interpretation 'the Trojan War could be regarded
as an important historical event--namely, as an act of
retaliation against the Sea Peoples,' this does not amount to a
new Trojan War, but only a new interpretation of
the Trojan War. Unless, of course, he wishes to imply
that, with his thesis of two Trojan Wars, his second is a 'new'
Trojan War. But this too is not new. Two Trojan Wars have long
been recognised. In fact, some critics believe in many Trojan
Wars.
It is unfortunate that Z. was unable to consult Drew's
latest book, in which he advances a completely different solution
to the same problem(s)--namely, that the key to the 'Crisis
Years' was a fundamental change in warfare: the introduction of
the foot-soldier, or infantry tactics.[[6]] Whether Drew's
hypothesis will stand the test of time, remains to be seen. At
all events, it appears to be much more solidly founded.
No less curious is Z.'s attitude towards Schliemann, for
whom he reserves no fewer than 12 pages (84-96). This is curious
because the entire discussion is essentially irrelevant--except
for his final conclusion, that one of Schliemann's "fundamental
statements was enough to send the whole of prehistoric
investigation of the Aegean--and the public--down the wrong road
for more than 100 years" (96). This, however, is sheer nonsense.
In the first place, it is a gross misrepresentation to cite, in
this context, Schliemann's first publication on Troy,
implying that Schliemann never changed his mind over the course
of the subsequent important campaigns at the site, especially
that of 1890, for whose continuation he had planned a 9-month
campaign in 1891, together with Doerpfeld. Had Schliemann
excavated in 1891 (and beyond), he would have been the first to
change his mind about the size of Troy. It also implies that all
serious scholars have been completely naive in (it would follow)
basing their approach exclusively on Schliemann's early
statement. Otherwise, Z.'s treatment of Schliemann is based
almost exclusively on the highly negative research of the last
two decades.[[7]] Furthermore, he judges Schliemann by the
criteria of today's archaeological methodology, not by that of
his own day. Such an approach is simply 'clever' hindsight.
Comparing Schliemann's view of Troy with what we know today, Z.
writes: "consequently, what Schliemann regarded as Troy was not
Troy at all, but only a small sector of an influential city".
That may be true, but it is completely misguided to claim that,
"that he overlooked this, had devastating consequences for
Aegean prehistory" (98), not to mention that it is grossly
exaggerated. To liken Schliemann to an archaeologist who, having
come upon Central Park in New York, concludes that the city did
not consist of millions of inhabitants, is absurd.
Z.s critique of Schliemann leads him into a critique of
Korfmann, the current excavator of Troy, whom he accuses of major
contradictions, whereby he has ostensibly also contributed to
confusion over the real size of Troy.
In fact, with this latter conflict we seem to come to the
heart of the book--at least so far as the title is concerned.
The title was presumably deftly chosen. Ostensibly, it should
read 'Ein neuer troianischer Krieg'. Kampf can mean more
than just 'war'--and probably does, because nowhere in the book
does a new Trojan War materialise. The real Kampf
seems to be fought in the "Nachwort" (281-89), which consists of
a bitter attack on Korfmann. If in this 'neuer Kampf um Troia'
Z.'s case is as weak as are the thesis and methodology in his
book (see Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 25 April, 1994),
he should have thought twice before writing the 'Nachwort'.
This 'Kampf' is in a way reminiscent of Schliemann's brush
with Captain Boetticher just over a hundred years ago. As
Schliemann was advised by colleagues, so now Korfmann and his
team would do well not to be side-tracked by carping from the
sidelines--rather that they continue undeterred, employing (as
they are in fact doing) the latest 'state of the art' methods,
for thereby they hold out the promise of elucidating many
questions related to the end of the Bronze Age and the beginning
of the Iron Age.
In conclusion, it is surely ironic (among other things),
that for his new interpretation Z. is most dependent on the two
archaeologists whom he most criticises--Schliemann and Korfmann,
the two to whom subsequent scholars may also become most indebted
for information about Troy.
NOTES
[[1]] In the case of The Flood from Heaven: Deciphering the
Atlantis Legend (London 1992), Anthony Snodgrass (Cambridge);
here, Jack Davis (Cincinnati).
[[2]] N. Sandars, The Sea Peoples (London2 1985), 13.
[[3]] Since Ilion is Greek, one would expect some ethnic
connection, but none is suggested. Likewise in the case of
Hisarlik.
[[4]] "Troy could have been at the center of the Western
Anatolian conspiracy, and presumably is also camouflaged behind
the mysterious land of the Ahhiyawa" (77).
[[5]] So far as I can tell, the phrase, 'Kampf um Troia,'
appears only once in the text: "in so far as it is a question of
battles before Troy itself, one could speak of "the 'Kampf
um Troia'" (68) (emphasis added). Otherwise, one encounters
the "Konflikt um Troia" (75).
[[6]] R. Drews, The End of the Bronze Age (Princeton,
1993).
[[7]] I.e., the Calder-Traill-Cobet School. Some of their
conclusions are indeed true, but their research certainly does
not represent the whole picture.