Rosenbloom, 'Athenian Identity and Civic Ideology', Bryn Mawr Classical Review 9409
URL = http://hegel.lib.ncsu.edu/stacks/serials/bmcr/bmcr-9409-rosenbloom-athenian
Alan L. Boegehold and Adele Scafuro (edd.), Athenian Identity
and Civic Ideology. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1994. Pp. 239. $35.00. ISBN 0-8018-4578-5.
Reviewed by David Rosenbloom -- Victoria University of
Wellington
This meticulously edited and proof-read volume is a collection of
nine conference papers and selected comments delivered at Brown
University in April 1990. Each paper has its own endnotes and
bibliography appended to it. The book has no index. The levels of
scholarship, writing, and argumentation it contains are
consistently high, and those interested in Athenian social,
political, and legal history will want to consult Athenian
Identity. The volume presents a sampling of the "cutting
edge" of American work on Athenian social and political identity,
and makes an excellent introduction to the questions that drive
analysis of the topic. The usefulness of "social" and
"political" as categories of analysis, how civic identity was
fashioned, the functions of ideology: these topics receive
important treatments in many of the papers assembled in the
volume.
The conference was not designed to promote any set of
methodological preferences, and the volume contains a wide range
of viewpoints. In her succinct introduction, Adele Scafuro sets
out the terms she considers fruitful for the study of the
Athenian polites and politeia, using as signposts
(among others) the work of Josiah Ober (on civic ideology), David
Cohen (on the social matrix of law), and Sally Humphreys (on the
relation between social and political). Seeking a wider
perspective on the identity of the polites and on the
network of relations and spheres of activity constituting the
politeia, S rejects the categories used by
"constitutionalists." They privilege legal criteria and
institutions in their definition of the citizen and of
citizenship, and they abstract "the political" from all other
forms of interaction, employing a paratactic model for the
elements of politeia, and hypotactic models of society
which subordinate all its elements to politics. S seeks to
understand the interactions and interpenetrations between society
and the polis, private and public, and oikos and
polis; she also actively seeks to question the rigidity
and exclusionary power of the boundaries between them. Rather
than detach the political from all spheres of activity (e.g.
Meier, Hansen), she prefers to see them embedded in one another,
and so to forge a middle position between the poles of Weber's
isolation of the political and Durkheim's fusion of it with all
forms of social interaction.
P. B. Manville's highly self-conscious manifesto, "Toward a New
Paradigm of Athenian Citizenship," takes up similar themes.
Enumerating the propositions that characterize the rapidly
outmoded "constitutionalist" model for understanding Athenian
law, politics, and society, he outlines and applies the "new
paradigm" to Solon's introduction of the tele,
Kleisthenes' reforms, and Perikles' citizenship law of 451/0; he
concludes by speculating about origins of the "new paradigm" in
our post-modern condition. M rejects the old paradigm's
definition of Athenian citizenship as (1) "a legal status defined
by a fixed set of juridical criteria," since this creates a
misleading set of assumptions and questions, and produces
illusory certainties about the identity of the citizen; and (2)
as an "identity representing privileges and protection in
opposition to an impersonal entity, the 'state.'" For M and
others, this proposition derives from anachronistic Marxist and
"traditional liberal" assumptions about the relationship of
individuals to the state. In the new paradigm,
politai=polis; there is no state, and hence, no
power over and above the corporation of citizens. (3) M rejects
the "old paradigm's" tendency to understand the citizen,
"primarily...through institutional contexts" because this
privileges narrowly political factors (access to Ekklesia, Boule,
etc.) over social factors in "representing the polis".
(4) He also rejects citizenship as "a value free concept." Law
and morality are not separate categories; the state and citizens
are not antagonistic. Such duties as jury and military service
are also forms of self and communal benefit. In general, the old
paradigm understands the polis as an inorganic, rational,
legalistic, and amoral abstraction; the new paradigm is an
organic model, tolerant of contradiction and duplication, which
prefers to see all spheres of society as interactive and mutually
defining, operating toward a self-defined goal, the good of the
community.
M reads the crucial moments of Athenian history as phases in a
socio-political evolution toward communal self-definition,
providing a model for telling the story of Athens which rejects
the cynical tales of individual ambition and the convoluted
machinations of clan power politics characteristic of both
ancient and modern explanations. In explaining Solon's
introduction of the tele, he focuses on the self-defining
character of the Hippeis and Zeugitai, who
(possibly) chose one another not on the basis of how many liquid
or dry measures they could produce, but "according to their
patriotism" (26). The point here is that abstract accounting did
not interfere with a group's ability to select (and exclude) its
own members according to a standard different from those
mandated. Kleisthenes' reforms are not pro-Alkmaionid
gerrymandering, nor a victory for isonomia in the march
toward democracy, but a socio-political evolution responsive to
change in the communal spirit, "that better provided for the
definition and participation of a community marked by demographic
or spiritual change over the preceding generations" (26).
Perikles' citizenship law is neither a leader's ploy to derail
the political careers of rivals born of foreign mothers, nor the
demos's attempt to horde imperial prerogatives, but
signifies "the consciousness and behavior of the general
community that accepted him as their leader" (26). According to
M, the size of polis was the primary issue as the
AP claims, but this, "is read to represent several
interconnected motives reflective of the subsurface attitudes and
beliefs of polis ideology" (27). The people felt that the
polis was growing too large to be organic and
self-defining; the law therefore preserves the very idea of the
polis by closing it off and making it self-defining by
"selves" who are homogeneous by birth.
M's paradigm opens exciting new horizons. But I am concerned
that the model incorporates polis ideology into itself so
completely that it actually duplicates it, when the task of the
historian in some cases may be to isolate it in contradistinction
to the actual conditions of Athenian life, to recover what it
suppresses, elides, and imagines, and to integrate this also into
a picture of the polis. By identifying the telos
of Athenian political life as self-definition, the new paradigm
simplifies the relationship between the ideologically constructed
"self" and the "self" in its actual setting, and imposes a single
narrative pattern on Athenian history. The anti-Marxist
proposition (2 above, politai=polis) in particular
is open to objection: it actually transplants a Marxist notion of
the "withering away of the state" into historical Athens.
Granted, the Athenians did not have a "state" in the modern sense
of an impersonal monster, a Leviathan, set over and above the
freedom of the individual, the consciousness that strife defines
the relation between authorized power and individual is endemic
to Greek culture, and Athenian ideology is so incongruous in its
cultural setting, that it may well mask significant distortion.
Achilles' quarrel with Agamemnon, who wields the scepter from
Zeus; Solon's adoption of alien identity to motivate the
Athenians to fight for Salamis despite the assembly's decree that
it was illegal and punishable by death; Antigone's burial of
Polyneikes; Teukros's resistance to the Atreidai in the
Aias: these are part of a continuous tradition that
recognizes the conflict of authorized power and the individual as
endemic to communal life. Power always has a face, to be sure,
and that face in Athens may be a composite of the demos;
but as Ober points out in his piece, the ideology
polis=politai, even if realized in Athens, is built
upon a potentially dangerous synecdoche; and this trope may mark
a turning away from actual relations. That law and morality are
indistinguishable (4) troubled me for the same reason. There is
no question that this was the Athenian ideology; but to what
degree does ideology distort reality? With regard to (3), the
rejection of institutional access as a defining feature of the
citizen because it deprivileges social factors in "representing
the polis," one may want to ask, as I did, how does the
social represent the political, and to what degree does it
accurately and informatively represent it? I learned much from
M's piece; but I missed an awareness of how representations of
the polis differ from its reality. The "new paradigm" is
helpful because it focuses on the question of representation; yet
it may need to construct a more solid semiotic foundation for its
new readings of old phenomena.
Adele Scafuro's paper, "Witnessing and False Witnessing:
Proving Citizenship and Kin Identity in Fourth-Century Athens,"
is a detailed and energetic study of how citizen status was
proved at inheritance trials. Those interested in the topic
will need to consult it both for its thoroughness and honesty.
The paper presents three major arguments: (1) the combination of
strict citizenship requirements and lack of a functional central
archive gave rise to the need for witnesses at trials where a
person's citizenship was called into question. Witness gathering
was a part of every citizen's life. (2) The repertory of
episodes from an individual's life used to prove citizenship was
more or less fixed and these events were constitutive of citizen
identity (i.e. amphidromia, dekate, introduction to
gennetai, ceremonials of the phratry, enrollment in the
deme, scrutiny for public office). (3) The dike
pseudomarturion is a frequent sequel to cases in which
witnesses testified for or against a person's citizen status, or
identified kin, and therefore is an index to the importance of
the act of bearing witness in these particular cases. S also
offers a developmental model of testimony to kinship and status:
the lack of archives produced the live witness as a remedy, but
this cure was itself a disease since witnesses lied; the dike
pseudomarturion was a remedy for lying witnesses but itself
"protracted the disease," because, for instance, if a defendant
lost a trial for xenia, he could try the plaintiff's
witness on a dike pseudomarturion and, if successful, get
a retrial on the xenia charge. The original virus,
however, is the lack of a functional archive to which the
Athenians might appeal in such cases. This generates the entire
system and its development.
I found myself questioning claims (1) and (2). S's appeal to
the lack of a functional archive to explain genesis of the
witness system was especially disappointing. It is remarkable
that the Athenians had deme registers, as S points out, but did
not use them as proof of citizenship status in court. Yet to
argue that the failure to use them coupled with the desire to
keep tight reins on citizenship caused the Athenian witness
system to develop seems tantamount to arguing that failure to use
compound bows, horses, and chariots (all of which were available
to the Greeks) coupled with the desire to rout their enemies
created the hoplite form of war. The failure to apply available
technologies to a particular system cannot explain the genesis of
the system. A central archive for the purpose of proving
citizenship was inconceivable to the Athenians and anachronistic
for their culture. I am aware, however, that intuitive
explanations such as the performative basis of speech and
identity in Hellas, the profound cultural skepticism accorded
paternity, claims about origins, and the truth of writing, and
the democracy's need to dramatize frequently and concretely acts
of inclusion in and exclusion from the polis (cf. Connor
41 in the volume) may not take us much further.
My skepticism of (2) involves the move S makes from the
catalogue of elements that signify civic identity in these
(mainly inheritance) cases, and those things that
constitute civic identity. Again, we encounter the
problem of how the social represents the polis. The paper
persuaded me that the elements of the catalogue functioned as
metonyms for civic identity, not exactly constitutive of that
identity, but rather a conventional and contextual code for it
specific to the occasion of the trial. It is theoretically
interesting to contemplate moments when the aspects of
citizenship we think of as "extent" and "content" are no longer
operative, as S does in this essay. But how much information can
such moments yield about what constitutes civic identity? How
can arguments that seek to prove legal inclusion in the citizen
body transcend legal criteria? Indeed, the essay made me
contemplate the possibility of an inverse relationship between
the content and extent of citizenship: in discourses that
fictionalize or assume criteria of extent as given, or on
occasions of performance that include outsiders--Panhellenic
festivals, theatrical spectacles, burial ceremonies, symbouleutic
and private speeches--the code representing the content of
Athenian citizenship seems to me to yield more information about
what constituted "being Athenian." True, such trials include
more information than the birth certificate that proves my
American citizenship, since they deal with a wider range of
witnessed, ritualized events, require more than a raised seal as
a sign of authenticity, and involve a significant degree of
ambiguity. Nonetheless, the Gettysburg Address, a fourth of July
celebration, or the Inauguration of a President will yield more
information about "being American" than my birth certificate.
Cynthia Patterson's elegant and concise paper, "The Case
against Neaira and the Public Ideology of the Athenian Family,"
shares with Scafuro the sense that political identity blossoms
from the root and branch of family and social identity, and that
our confidence in exclusionary categories of Athenian politics
and society is perhaps illusory. Starting from the axiom that
the oikos is a molecular unit of society held together by
the bond of marriage, and that the person is an anonymous atom
outside of it, she infers that women had "significant and
substantial" roles in the oikos and polis,
symmetrical with that of men, based on an "involvement in, and
commitment to, the public life of the polis" over and above that
of producers of legitimate children. The facile analogies of
female/male, inside/outside, oikos/polis, and their
corollary that women were excluded from the "citizen's club"
violate the more complex patterning of Athenian social and
political life. P derives support for her view from Herodotos's
story of Lykides, who suggested to the Boule that they consider
Mardonios's offer of surrender/alliance in the Spring 479, and
was stoned to death for it. When the Athenian women heard this,
they went to his house (unbidden) and stoned his wife and
children to death (Hdt. 9.5). For Herodotos, the entire episode
is a terrible act (*A)QHNAI=OI DE\ AU)TI/KA DEINO\N
POIHSA/MENOI). Is it convincing to derive social and political
norms from it? In less stressful times, perhaps, the males would
be outraged, as when they consider female retribution against the
sole survivor of a military expedition more terrible than the
loss of the men (Hdt. 5.87.2-3). P points out that citizen women
were exploiters, and that they identified with the interests of
the polis; but these are not decisive points, since all
would agree that metics and some slaves exploited others and
shared in the interests of the polis.
When it comes to the Kata Neairan, however, P presents
a strong reading of Apollodoros's rhetoric and its implication
with civic ideology. The point is this: we cannot deny that it
is Neaira who is on trial for xenia and we must understand
this as a function of female citizenship in some sense. What is
problematic and interesting about P's essay, however, is the way
she interweaves rhetoric, ideology, and civic reality. She
recognizes that Apollodoros targets Neaira to strike at
Stephanos, and that by concentrating on Neaira-Phano, Apollodoros
has license to conflate them, and to paint a composite picture of
their corruption of Athenian ideals. Her reading of the speech
illuminates Apollodoros's rhetorical choices in terms of Athenian
civic ideology. I had some difficulties with her implied move
from ideology to civic reality. To be sure, "To the Athenian
audience, whether in the theater or the law court, marriage
represented the first political bond of the polis and was a
potent symbol of the political order" (211). But I was not
convinced that the ideological symbol could be cashed in at its
face value in the political realm. Though I was sympathetic to
P's case, it still seemed to me that the excessive investment in
such symbolic formations as Apollo's at A. Eu. 217-18
which P cites approvingly, or Aphrodite's in the Danaids
(A. fr.44) function to debar the female citizen from the
political realm, and are deliberate and context-dependent
manipulations of a code that mask the realities of Athenian
political life. I questioned a one-to-one correspondence between
social symbolism and the actual conditions of the polis.
The masking function of ideology is a topic W.R. Connor takes
up in his brief but illuminating demonstration of the inadequacy
of a legal definition of the citizen identity. In "The Problem
of Athenian Civic Identity," he shows how the Athenian myth of
autochthony suppresses the anomalous diversity of the Athenian
community, allays an anxiety about the origins and purity of the
Athenians, forgets moments in Athenian history when the community
opened itself to foreigners and slaves (e.g. Solon's and
Kleisthenes' reforms), and glosses over those pockets of Attika
in which synoecism was imperfect. Legal definition is not
problematic; ideological self-definition resists contradiction
and uncertainty, producing a need for self-dramatization and
imaginary solutions.
In "Premarital Sex, Illegitimacy, and Male Anxiety in
Menander and Athens," David Konstan argues that Kharisios's
rejection of Pamphile (who bore and exposed a nothos 5
months after their marriage) in Menander's Epitrepontes
does not stem from anxiety that his wife had sex before their
marriage (though it may have been a factor), and that his
decision to take her back after he reflects on his own (supposed)
fathering of a nothos by Habrotonon is unrelated to any
empathetic awareness of the violence of rape. The basis of his
decision is precisely the displacement of these considerations.
The shared and symmetrical atuchemata of husband and wife
involve no adikemata against persons; rather, they violate
the integrity of the oikos. As K claims, "...Kharisios
seems to have internalized just the set of responses necessary to
sustain and reproduce the social code that sought to guarantee
the citizen line and its exclusive access to landed property"
(225). Views of Kharisios's rejection of Pamphile based upon
fear of female sexuality outside of marriage, and attempts to
explain his decision to take her back on the grounds of a deeper
understanding of the trauma of rape, K argues, impose an alien
viewpoint upon the language and ideology of the play. The Greeks
and the Athenians did not make an anatomical distinction between
virgin and non-virgin, did not see widows as "damaged goods," did
not distinguish the roles of penetrated and penetrator along
simple gender lines, and treated sexual desire pretty much as any
other appetite, capable of being satisfied for a payment, and
subject to over-indulgence. Also, because rape can be considered
a less serious offense than seduction, the violation of the
person is less significant than the violation of the
oikos. K admits that portions of this explanatory section
are speculative and contingent upon some difficult source
interpretation; but their relevance as explanations are difficult
to deny.
K employs a sense of ideology that seems to me implicit in
Connor's paper, but differs from those of Manville, Scafuro, and
Patterson: Althusser's Marxist-Lacanian view that, "All ideology
represents in its necessarily imaginary distortion not the
existing relations of production (and the other relations that
derive from them), but above all the (imaginary) relationship of
individuals to the relations of production and the relations that
derive from them. What is represented in ideology is therefore
not the system of real relations which govern the existence of
individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals to
the real relations in which they live" (citation on n.18 p.232).
This is the crux of the matter: when do we read ideology as a
representation of social and political reality, and when do we
read it as imaginary distortion of it?
Josiah Ober's paper, "Civic Ideology and Counterhegemonic
Discourse: Thucydides on the Sicilian Debate," draws in
interesting ways from the work of Foucault, Austin, and Gramsci
to construct a reading of Thucydides' depiction of the speeches
in the debate before the Sicilian expedition. For O, Thucydides'
Histories can be read as an act of resistance to the
hegemonic ideology of democratic Athens; and in the Sicilian
debate, his text dramatizes a moment when the blinding effects of
that ideology were destined to destroy the polis.
Self-consciously resistant ideologies, we might say, view their
rivals as imaginary solutions to complex and intractable
realities. Thucydides formulates a critique of what O calls,
"democratic knowledge," primarily the speech acts that comprise
assembly meetings, but also the beliefs that pass for knowledge
and fortify the democracy's self-definition and goals (e.g.
Harmodios and Aristogeiton were tyrannicides; Segesta had funds
for the expedition; Sicilian poleis were feeble and
unorganized). O's reading demonstrates how, in Thucydides'
critical vision, the agonistic setting of Athenian political
decision-making combined with the ideology of homonoia
which depends on the trope of synecdoche (the part of the
citizenry that makes policy stands for the whole polis)
create irresistible pressures on language which erode its power
to represent the truth, and transform it into action. Thucydides
exposes the mythical foundations of democratic knowledge in
violations of the logos-ergon divide. The
discourse that formulates and maintains democratic ideology
represents a simplified, purblind version of reality and causes
epithumia-eros to displace pronoia in the
minds of its speakers and its audience, activating the fantasy of
a unified body politic which silences all intelligent opposition.
We can also see this effect as generic transgression: the
ideology of the funeral oration imposes itself on the
symbouleutic discourse of the Assembly. This is a powerful and
careful analysis; and it allows us to see the Sicilian debate and
Thucydides' representation of democratic ideology in a new light.
O does not deny that Thucydides' resistance extends to the truth
regimes of other poleis and political forms, but I
wondered whether the emphasis on Thucydides' resistance to
Athenian democratic ideology could be read as a resistance to all
truth regimes, irrespective of the form of the community, on the
basis of historical knowledge. Constructing its own truth regime
with its own claim to pronoia, Thucydides' text might be
guilty of the same transgression as the democracy: transgressing
the logos-ergon divide.
Ian Morris in "Everyman's Grave," shares with Ober the
realization that ideologies are in competition with one another,
and uses evidence from 5th century tombs in Athens and Hellas to
challenge both the written record and modern historian's
interpretations of it concerning the rise and peak of the
egalitarian ethos in Athens. During the first three quarters of
the fifth century expenditure on private tombs was minimized and
the difference between "elite" and "non-elite" citizen was
virtually imperceptible at the grave, but c. 430-425 periboloi
become more common as a declaration of the "elite" status of the
deceased. Areas of resistance to the Panhellenic egalitarian
fashion in burial remained in Athens among the "international
aristocracy," and are particularly evident in Thessaly, Boiotia,
and the Cyclades. Intriguing (and ambiguous) evidence for
Athenian resistance comes in the form of the white-ground
lekythoi which depict a visit to a heroic tumulus-stele grave, or
show a maiden preparing for such a visit. Common in Athens
between 470 and 450, but on their way out by c.400, these
lekythoi are not demotic (30% of the graves excavated in the
Kerameikos and Syntagma contain them, especially graves that have
3 or more pots placed in them, with a slight preference for
cremations over inhumations), but are more widespread than the
narrow elite actually able to afford the large tombs and stelai
represented on the pot. M considers the imagery of these lekythoi
as initially double sided--an anti-egalitarian statement for
some, and a testament for others to the power of democracy "to
tame elitism." These images eventually vulgarized the reality of
the elitist grave site, and elites sought a new set of symbols to
represent themselves, appropriating the glorious imagery, not of
the heroic era, but of the Athenian civic past as a new language
of prestige. Aristocrats effect a kind of Hegelian synthesis: by
adopting the symbols of civic burial of the war dead at the
Kerameikos that eclipsed their heroic monuments, they proclaimed
themselves both citizens and aristocrats. M offers a compelling
model for the development of the visual impact of such tombs:
500-425 private tombs evoked the athanaton kleos model of
Homeric and archaic hero; during this same period the
polis developed an alternate symbolism that diluted the
representational power of private monument; by the 420's the
aristocracy "muscled in" on polis symbolism,
reappropriated the private glory of the fathers, but did so on a
new level, not as heroes in the Homeric fashion, who brought
"suffering to the people," but as patriots and aristocrat
benefactors of the polis, prostatai demou. It was
not a question of rivaling the polis in
expenditure--aristocrats realized this could not be done--but of
annexing the symbolism of the state funeral for self-presentation
of elite status.
The boldest and most controversial part of M's paper is his
application of this model to challenge the standard view of the
development of egalitarian ideology in Athens, by claiming that
it peaked not c. 433-400, but before 430, perhaps as early as the
Kimonian era in Athens, when aristocratic mechanisms of
government and policy harmonized perfectly with the ethos of the
people. This is a possible story; but one assumption we might
want to challenge is that ideological formations take place in a
zero sum game: M assumes that gains in aristocratic self
expression necessarily entail a weakening of the democratic
ethos. The period from 430 is a period of fervent cultural
change that produced a host of non-aristocratic elites: in
politics (Kleon, Kleophon, etc.); in culture (actors,
scene-painters, musicians, choreographers, dancers, philosophers,
sophists, rhetoricians); in the economy (manufacturers, traders,
bankers), and so on. Self designation as an "elite" grew more
complex, and included many more markers than the grave-site. An
alternate story is possible: the democratic ethos was so
confidently hegemonic, and the possibility for self-presentation
as an elite so diffused throughout Athenian culture, that
aristocrats asserted their ancestral birth right in the language
of the democratic funeral without being perceived as inimical to
the egalitarian ethos, which had now embraced a wide variety of
elites. It may be that when ideology X reaches its zenith,
counter-ideology Y responds in kind. On a different model of
ideological formation, we might arrive at a different story.
This is not to deny the plausibility and interest of M's story.
M recommends that, "We do better to follow the indications of the
archaeological record rather than to rely on evolutionary
assumptions." But his account contains assumptions about the
evolution of competing ideologies and about the relative value
importance of ideological markers. We cannot deny the importance
of funerary symbolism, but we may ask whether its importance
allows M to make the kinds of inferences he makes apart from the
cultural developments that transformed Athenian culture during
the same period.
Space does not allow a more thorough treatment of the volume's
remaining essays. In "Aspects of Early Athenian Citizenship,"
Frank Frost argues that Athenian citizenship has no recognizable
content until the reforms of Kleisthenes. One may quarrel with
the assumptions that content depends upon the attainment of a
certain extent before it is an operative category, and that some
universally valid benefit must be linked to citizenship. Alan
Boegehold offers a fascinating short piece, "Perikles'
Citizenship Law of 451/0 B.C.," which challenges us to imagine
the origins of the Periklean law in the actual practices of the
Heliastic courts. Brothers with the same father competed for
inheritance: if one had an Athenian mother, and the other a
foreign mother, the "pure" Athenian would argue that he was
entitled to his father's kleros on this basis; and the
popular jury was persuaded. What began as a sure-fire argument
in the Heliaia ended up enshrined as law. In "Private Lives and
Public Enemies: Freedom of Thought in Classical Athens," R.W.
Wallace reviews cases in which foreigners and Athenians were
tried on the basis of what they thought and said, in an effort to
define the sphere of "intellectual freedom" in Athens. In a
masterful work of source criticism, he reasserts and modifies
K.J. Dover's skepticism about the trials of foreign
hetairai, intellectuals and philosophers at Athens, but
more importantly draws our attention to the often neglected case
of the musical theorist, Damon of Oa, whose ostracism in the
mid-440's is extraordinary. His conclusion, that "Individual
behavior that directly harmed the polis was subject to legal
control. Individual behavior that affected only the individual
was not" (146), is judicious and sensitive to the extra-legal
motives for litigation.